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A message of cheer from the land of the West 
I speed o’er the wave from an Irishman’s breast 
To the Feain of Erin, the hope of the Gael 
The children of Finn from the North to the Pale 
To the valleys of Munster a message I send 
To her faithful battalions who stand to defend 
Her borders as Finn did in days that are past 
When he swept on the foe like a hurricane blast 
His spirit’s abroad in the country today 
Tho’ youthful and few you are leading the way, 
May you stand in the path with your rifle and spears 
And hold it for Finn and the New Volunteers. 
 
 
 
 
      Joseph McGarrity, 1915 
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ABSTRACT 
 
 
              POLITICAL RESISTANCE AND ACTIVISM IN IRISH AMERICA:  
                                       THE CLAN NA GAEL 1912-1916 
 
 
                Sara Bethany Bornemann 
 
                         April 11, 2018 
 
 
 This thesis is a historical examination of a group of male Irish Americans, the  
 
Clan na Gael, that sought Ireland’s independence from Britain during the years 1912- 
 
1916. This is a chronological study of the four years leading up to the Irish rebellion  
 
known as the Easter Rising, but it is examined from the American side of the Atlantic.  
 
The Clan na Gael was not successful politically, but had outsized influence financially on  
 
the efforts to gain Ireland’s independence.  
 
 Analysis of primary source material makes the compelling argument that in   
 
focusing on elite political actors, maintaining a vociferous public relations campaign, and  
 
most importantly fundraising locally and regionally, the Clan exerted outsized influence  
 
on the “Irish Question” in the years 1912-1916.  
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                                                         INTRODUCTION  
 
 
 
From 1866-1871, John Devoy was incarcerated in British jails for his part in 
plotting an Irish rebellion against the British. In January of 1871, he was granted an early 
release with four other Irish rebels, on condition of exile. Devoy and his compatriots all 
chose America for their new home, but none ever stopped looking across the Atlantic 
towards Ireland. Devoy was 29, he had a fine mind and compelling journalistic abilities. 
But his best talent was organizing and mobilizing on behalf of Irish independence. His 
past efforts on its behalf were hardly set aside, for just as soon as Devoy landed in New 
York City, he immediately set about reestablishing and renewing a badly demoralized 
Irish nationalist movement in America. Devoy had no idea that he would live in America 
until his death in 1929. Devoy’s legacy stretched from the Fenian past of the Victorian 
Age to a twentieth century resurgent rebel movement that culminated in the Easter 
Rebellion in Dublin 1916. Devoy was the heart, soul, motor, brains and brawn of the Irish 
independence movement in America.  
The Fenian Brotherhood was an Irish and Irish American republican group that 
operated through the middle part of the nineteenth century in America and in Ireland. The 
Clan na Gael, an Irish American nationalist group, came into existence with the demise 
of the Fenians in the late 1870s. The Clan na Gael was ultimately more successful than 
the Fenian Brotherhood for a number of reasons, chief among them steady leadership, 
better organizational apparatus, and a commitment to Ireland’s independence that did
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promote terror tactics. In fact, the Clan na Gael initiative that failed most spectacularly 
was its one foray into terrorism: the “Dynamite Wars” of the 1880s targeted British 
infrastructure,  and military and political leaders. A faction of Clan leadership supported 
“any means necessary” to secure Irish independence, including the use of dynamite at 
civilian institutions. Current historians argue that the “Dynamite Wars” conducted by the 
Clan were the first modern examples of terrorism.1 The schism that developed as a result 
of this policy illuminated the Clan membership’s general distrust of terrorist tactics to 
further Irish nationalist hopes, and the Clan na Gael weeded out the members responsible 
for the policy. Emerging from the split stronger, Clan na Gael leadership ushered in the 
twentieth century with new strategies: to continue to fund Ireland’s domestic nationalist 
efforts like the Irish Republican Brotherhood, the Clan’s sister organization in Ireland. 
The Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) also reconstituted itself from Fenian remnants. 
The IRB was also a secret, oath-bound organization dedicated to an independent, 
democratic Ireland.  The Clan na Gael in America sought to promote Irish national pride 
groups like the Gaelic League, and to center their activism around head of state actors 
who could influence Anglo-American foreign policy to better effect Irish independence. 
The second decade of the twentieth century was momentous for Irish nationalist hopes, 
and the Clan na Gael rode a rising tide of international support for the hopes of a free and 
independent Ireland. In particular, the years from 1912-1916 illuminate the highs and 
                                                     
1 See Lindsay Clutterbuck, “The Progenitors of Terrorism: Russian Revolutionaries or 
Extreme Irish Republicans?” Terrorism and Political Violence, Volume 16, Issue 1 
(2004) and Niall Whehelan, The Dynamiters: Irish Nationalism and Political Violence in 
the Wider World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012) and Joseph McKenna, 
The Irish American Dynamite Campaign: a history, 1881-1896, (Jefferson, N.C.: 
McFarland & Company, 2012) 
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The Clan na Gael, risen from the Fenian Brotherhood’s ashes, assumed the 
mantle of activism for Irish nationalist efforts in America. While the Clan na Gael is 
underrepresented in the current historiography, one can weave together tangential 
characters and narratives to discover a faithful representation of its activities and 
motivations. Irish American history is a popular and fruitful topic for historians. 
Whatever the cause for the abundance of examinations of Irish history, this study joins 
the ranks, with one crucial departure. This is not a study of an evolving Irish American 
nationalism, nor is it a study of British perfidy and Irish martyrdom. This examination 
looks at a specific group of Irish Americans, and their actions in the four-year period 
leading up to the Easter Rising of 1916. The Clan’s actions in this four-year period is 
neglected in the historiography. Thus, this research project focuses exclusively on the 
Clan na Gael, a secret, oath-bound group of male Irish Americans who aggressively 
sought Ireland’s independence from Britain. For this research project, I ask: how did the 
Clan na Gael affect Irish American public opinion in the years 1912-1916? The Clan na 
Gael’s focus on moving the dial of Irish American public opinion ultimately led to 
greater success in attaining their goal of Irish independence. Although world events 
proved to be the crucial tipping point, I argue that the ground game that Clan na Gael 
leadership pursued in 1912-1916 created more pressure for Irish independence efforts. 
From 1912-1916, the Clan na Gael maintained this pressure, and at the end of World 
War I, a fundamentally altered international scene joined Irish nationalists in agitating for 
Irish independence. Although Irish independence was far from assured, it was clear that 
the Clan na Gael’s participation financially and politically contributed to the epochal 
shift in public opinion. By focusing on elite political actors, maintaining a vociferous 
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public relations campaign, and most importantly fundraising locally and regionally, the 
Clan exerted outsized influence on the “Irish Question” in the years 1912-1916. Through 
the efforts of John Devoy and the Clan na Gael in those years, Irish American opinion 
and the Irish American Roman Catholic hierarchy were persuaded that only an 
independent, republican Ireland was an acceptable political solution to the “Irish 
question.” 
Ireland was formally bound to Britain in the Acts of Union (1801). The creation 
of the United Kingdom was determined by the wholesale practice of patronage and 
peerage in Ireland. In order to pass the legislation, Irish legislators agreed to vote 
themselves out of existence: 83 Irish boroughs were disenfranchised, and the remaining 
33 were reduced to one-member seats.1 Financial disbursements of over one million 
pounds were distributed throughout the disenfranchised boroughs, and peerages were 
created on a grand scale. With the new parliamentary set-up, Ireland was formally a 
junior partner in the relationship with Britain. This could be seen clearly in Britain’s 
economic relationship with Ireland. Industrialization replaced the foundering cotton-
spinning industry in Northern Ireland, and new industries like ship-building and shirt-
making helped to propel the North into a more integrated economic position with 
Britain.2 The agricultural Southern Irish counties were less fortunate, and relied on small 
lots and subsistence crops to maintain a bleak existence. Cash crops were raised and 
exported to Britain to create the necessary hard currency to pay the rack rents extorted by 
                                                     
1 www.historyofparliamentonline.org, “The Union with Ireland, 1800,” accessed 7 
January 2018, 
2 Charles Callan Tansill, America and the Fight For Irish Freedom, 1866-1922: An Old 
Story Based On New Data, (New York: The Devon-Adair Company, 1957), 9 
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landlords. By the mid-1800s, Ireland was ripe for economic disaster. The Potato Famine 
of the 1840s provided it.  
 Devastation stalked the Irish countryside. Insufficient British relief efforts 
indicate that there was a willful indifference to the Irish dying by the millions. One 
incontrovertibly successful relief measure, releasing Ireland from her exports to Britain, 
was deemed “economic interference.”3 Had Ireland been able to keep her cash crops and 
use them for feeding her people throughout the failed potato crop years, Ireland would 
not have suffered the catastrophic loss of life through starvation and emigration. Yet even 
as the Irish starved, a new nationalism was being born.  
 Rebellious Irishmen like Thomas Francis Meager, Gavan Duffy, and John Mitchel 
were not content with a passive voice in Parliament, for they believed “the Irish people 
have a first and indefeasible right to this island and to all moral and material wealth and 
resources thereof, to possess and govern the same for their own use, maintenance and 
comfort and honour as a sovereign state.”4 Such rhetoric was deemed high treason by the 
British government, and those Irish nationalists who professed such beliefs were tried and 
sentenced to serve hard terms. Those who escaped prosecution often fled to America, 
where they nursed and fed their resistance to English rule through the creation of 
societies like the Irish Republican Brotherhood and the Fenian Brotherhood.  
 In Dublin March 1858, James Stephens founded the Irish Republican Brotherhood 
(IRB) at the behest of Irish republicans now exiled in America. Stephens’ IRB was reliant 
on funds raised by Irish agitators in America- a continuum of financial dependence that 
                                                     
3 Tansill, America and the Fight For Irish Freedom, 1866-1922, 20 
4 John Mitchel, The United Irishman, in Tansill, American and the Fight For Irish 
Freedom, 1866-1922, 23 
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was never ameliorated during the years of the fight for Irish independence. The American 
wing of the IRB, called the Fenian Brotherhood, began operations in April 1859. Both the 
IRB and Fenians were republican organizations- they believed in a sovereign Irish state. 
However,  another breed of Irish nationalism was actually more dominant throughout the 
middle and late 1800s:  a more moderate ideology that recognized the Irish language and 
culture as distinct yet equal to Anglo culture, but did not see total separation from the 
United Kingdom as immediately necessary. The conflict between republicanism and 
nationalism in Ireland and in Irish America remained a theme well into the twentieth 
century. 
 The Fenian Brotherhood in America suffered from a variety of ills: although it 
was a secret organization, it was littered with informers. The military endeavors of the 
Fenians were all failures, and even Irish American opinion soon soured on the 
organization. But the Fenian Brotherhood was staffed and led by some very able Irish 
republicans, and they kept the flame of Irish independence alive even as the Fenian 
Brotherhood subsided into ashes. The remnants of the Fenians were incorporated into a 
new organization aimed at securing Irish independence: the Clan na Gael.  
 The Clan na Gael (Clan) was led by former Fenians John Devoy and Jeremiah 
O’Donovan Rossa, and younger men such as Daniel Cohalan and Joseph McGarrity. A 
split in the Clan leadership in the 1880s over the use of dynamite as a terror tactic in 
Britain and Dublin was reconciled by 1900, and the newly recoupled Clan pledged “the 
complete independence of the Irish people, and the establishment of an Irish republic.”5 It 
must be noted, however, that the Clan did not abhor physical force; the leadership just 
                                                     
5 Tansill, America and the Fight For Irish Freedom,1866-1922, 121 
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did not believe in the use of terror tactics that resulted in civilian casualties. Thus, the 
Clan also vowed  “physical force is the only engine a revolutionary organization can 
consistently and successfully use to realize the hopes of lovers of freedoms in lands 
subject to the bonds of oppression.” 
 The first decade of the twentieth century laid the groundwork for the political and 
financial exertions the Clan undertook in the years of this study. In particular, the 
campaign to fight Home Rule in Ireland assumed massive importance for the Clan. Home 
Rule in Ireland meant the devolution of local affairs into local management, and would 
grant an Irish parliament to manage and legislate for the Irish. It was a federal solution, 
and Home Rule “permitted the accommodation of local, distinct groups within the 
context of a broader political framework. In this condition, groups could maintain their 
identity while retaining the political and economic benefits of a larger political unit- in 
this case, the British Empire.”6 Needless to say, any political association with Britain and 
the Empire that did not recognize Ireland’s total autonomy was anathema to the Clan na 
Gael. Home Rule Bill 3 passed Parliament in 1912, but the implementation of the bill 
stalled under the weight of the opposition to it. Ironically, the most strenuous opposition 
to Home Rule came from within Ireland: the Ulster Unionist Party flatly rejected any 
form of political separation from Britain. The Ulster Unionists proposed an “exclusion” 
of four northern Irish counties from the proposed Home Rule parliament. Political 
separation from Britain was an abomination to the Ulster Unionists, but exclusion of any 
part of Ireland was equally abhorrent to John Redmond’s Irish Party. For Redmond and 
                                                     
6 Joseph P. Finnan, John Redmond and Irish Unity, 1912-1918, (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 2004), 38 
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the Irish Party, Home Rule meant all of Ireland. For the Clan, Home Rule was a bandage 
when amputation was necessary. The Clan exploited the interim between passage and 
implementation of Home Rule, and were aided and abetted by the advent of World War I.                    
There is a surprising lack of focus on what Irish American groups did to maintain 
a spotlight on their homeland from the safety of the western side of the Atlantic. Studies 
that do focus on Irish American nationalist efforts have emphasized the Fenian 
Brotherhood’s role. As well, the narrative of the Irish immigrant experience has been 
thoroughly examined in Kerby Miller’s Emigrants and Exiles,7 and Thomas N. Brown’s 
Irish-American Nationalism, 1870-1890.8 These two benchmark studies have provided a 
base for future scholarship in Irish American histories. Allusions to the activities of the 
Clan abound in histories of Irish American nationalism, and many scholars utilize the 
memoirs of the main actors, but no one has scrutinized only the Clan during these years. 
There exists no extended treatment of the Clan, no scholarly examination, and no studies 
of the specific years mentioned. In order to understand the Irish American opposition to 
entrance into World War One, and hostility towards Home Rule in Ireland, an 
investigation into the Clan na Gael’s leadership, rank and file, and activism during the 
years of 1912-1916 is crucial. 
 John Devoy’s autobiography provides the meta-narrative for the Clan, but ends 
with the Easter Rising of 1916; also, the stopping point for this project.9 The official 
                                                     
7 Kerby A. Miller, Emigrants and Exiles: Ireland and the Irish Exodus to North America, 
(New York: Oxford University Press) 1988 
8 Thomas N. Brown, Irish American Nationalism, 1870-1890, (New York: J.B. 
Lippincott) 1966 
9 John Devoy, Recollections of an Irish Rebel: The Fenian Movement. It’s Origins and 
Progress. Methods of Work in Ireland and in the British Army. Why It Failed To Achieve 
Its Main Object, But Exercised Great Influence on Ireland’s Future. Personalities of the 
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record of events closely aligns with Devoy’s. Every scholar has utilized Devoy’s 
autobiography as a source: either directly through his “Recollections,” or indirectly via 
his editorial voice in the pages of the Gaelic American, the Irish nationalist periodical in 
New York City. Devoy’s Recollections are an obvious starting point for research on the 
Clan na Gael: as the acknowledged leader of the group, Devoy’s perspective is critical in 
understanding the “hows” and “whys” of the Clan’s objectives and how they pursued 
them.  
Terry Golway’s Irish Rebel: John Devoy and America’s Fight For Ireland’s 
Freedom biography is the only current scholarly examination of John Devoy, and 
therefore becomes a primer of Irish American nationalism and specifically the Clan na 
Gael.10 It reads like a novel, but is nonetheless carefully researched. This monograph 
traces the whole arc of Devoy’s life, and his unflagging activism on behalf of Irish 
independence. Less hagiographical and more critical, Sean Cronin’s The McGarrity 
Papers- Revelations of the Irish Revolutionary Movement in Ireland and America 1900-
1940 provides a complementary narrative.11 Joseph McGarrity was also part of the Clan 
na Gael’s Executive Council- and worked in tandem with Devoy to agitate for Irish 
independence. Both McGarrity and Devoy were inexhaustible correspondents, and much 
of the primary source material in this research project comes from their communications. 
Cronin does not hesitate to highlight McGarrity’s divergences with Devoy- specifically 
                                                     
Organization. The Clan-na-Gael and the Rising of Easter Week, 1916. A Personal 
Narrative by John Devoy. (New York City: Charles P. Young) 1929     
 
10 Terry Golway, Irish Rebel: John Devoy and America’s Fight For Ireland’s Freedom, 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998) 
11 Sean Cronin, The McGarrity Papers-Revelations of the Irish Revolutionary Movement 
in Ireland and America 1900-1940, (Tralee: Anvil Press, 1972)   
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McGarrity’s faith in Sir Roger Casement, a knight of the British Empire who became one 
of the Irish nationalists’ most famous champions. Overall, McGarrity and Devoy were 
remarkably unified in their leadership of the Clan na Gael- but the small differences 
between them serve to underscore the complexities of the organization’s management.   
David Sim’s A Union Forever details the conflicts and resolutions in Anglo-
American diplomatic relations in the Victorian age, arguing that Irish American 
nationalists inadvertently knitted England and America’s diplomatic relationship closer 
together, rather that tearing them apart.12 This theme of unintended consequences 
replayed again in the early twentieth century, but this time the Irish American nationalists 
benefitted: as I argue in this thesis. To read Sim’s study is to learn of early failures for 
Irish American nationalists, but most importantly, it introduces the cast of what became 
the future Clan na Gael: many of the early Clan na Gael leaders were the original 
Fenians featured in Sims’ monograph.   
William D’Arcy’s The Fenian Movement in the U.S., 1858-1886 traces the Fenian 
Brotherhood from its inception until its final gasp in 1886. 13 Because so many members 
of the Clan na Gael were initially either members or at least contributors to the Fenian 
Brotherhood, it is useful to examine the Fenians more closely for insights into the future 
Clan.  D’Arcy encompasses all the Fenian activities during its existence, and his 
monograph illuminates the scope of the group’s actions in the second half of the 19th 
                                                     
12 David Sim, A Union Forever: The Irish Question and U.S. Foreign Relations in The 
Victorian Age, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013)  
13 William D’Arcy, The Fenian Movement in The U.S., 1858-1886, (Washington D.C.: 
Catholic University Of America Press, 1947) 
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century. D’Arcy’s monograph answers the question of “who” the Clan members were, at 
least in its first years.  
  Charles C. Tansill’s monograph America and the Fight For Irish Freedom 
1866-1922: An Old Story Based Upon New Data directly responds to my research 
question because it examines the Clan’s effectiveness in my research period. 14 
Ultimately, Tansill argues the Clan na Gael was not more successful because of specific 
objectives or strategic policies; rather, world events (particularly World War I) played 
into the dismantling of the British Empire. Irish nationalist groups’ constant resistance to 
a constitutional solution (i.e. Home Rule) made any alternative to total autonomy a non-
starter. Tansill argues that from the British side of affairs, a combination of poor policy 
decisions all served to ally world opinion against the British. Tansill continues his 
analysis on the American side, contending that as Wilson’s Anglophilia became more 
apparent, Irish Americans became more vocally nationalist. The cause of Irish 
independence developed global sympathy. The Irish American nationalists in the Clan na 
Gael used the British preoccupation with World War I for their own purposes, and 
actively championed United States’ neutrality. Britain’s failure to act quickly during the 
first readings of the Home Rule bill, combined with allowing the Ulster Unionists 
unlimited posturing and rhetoric, created a perfect opportunity for the Irish nationalist 
groups to reassert themselves.  
Francis M. Carroll’s American Opinion on the Irish Question, 1910-1923: A 
Study in Opinion and Policy is useful for its measured assessment of the state actors and 
                                                     
14 Tansill, America and the Fight For Irish Freedom, 1866-1922 
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Clan na Gael members involved in the debate over the “Irish Question.” This study 
argues that a constitutional solution to Irish independence had broad public support for 
the first years of the 1910s.15 However, the build-up to World War I, the war and its 
aftermath, created a more militant Irish American public. These Irish Americans were no 
longer content with a gradual constitutional approach, and now supported a more radical 
answer to the “Irish question.” Carroll traces the apex of the Home Rule movement and 
John Redmond’s role as a constitutionalist to its dramatic drop off after the Rising. The 
monograph’s focus on “American opinion” means that the British side of affairs is not so 
deeply examined. Nonetheless, Carroll concludes that Home Rule would have been 
implemented as a semi-satisfactory conclusion if World War I not changed the situation’s 
dynamic.  Carroll’s tight focus on 13 years of the “Irish question” is indispensable for any 
project on 20th century Irish American nationalism.  
Joseph P. Finnan’s John Redmond and Irish Unity, 1912-1918 was invaluable in 
creating a multi-dimensional understanding of the Clan’s opposition stance.16 This 
monograph was crucial in understanding the Clan na Gael’s opposition and activism 
against Home Rule.  
Finnan’s research period makes for an extremely tight study of Irish politics in 
that time frame. The parliamentary Irish Party, led by John Redmond, sought a) the 
passage of a Home Rule Bill and b) its implementation. The Clan did not support this 
position, arguing for Ireland’s complete independence. The author traces the challenges 
                                                     
15 Francis M. Carroll, American Opinion on the Irish Question, 1910-1923: A Study in 
Opinion and Policy, (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 1978) 
16 Joseph P. Finnan, John Redmond and Irish Unity, 1912-1918, (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 2004)   
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of Irish Party hegemony over the Irish nationalists, Redmond’s course in navigating 
Parliament, Prime Ministers Asquith and Lloyd George, and his own constituents. The 
outbreak of World War One condemned the Irish Party to maneuvering within a domestic 
political scene intrinsically focused on patriotic duty and winning a war, not on separatist 
questions of dominion status during an all-out war effort. Where the Irish Party once 
commanded widespread, majority public support, by 1916 ( the end of this research 
project’s time frame), the same was decisively untrue. The Clan used this to their 
advantage, and worked assiduously to undermine the Home Rulers and Redmond.  
Other scholars have also shed light on pieces of the Clan na Gael puzzle. Patricia 
Jalland and John Stubb’s journal article, “The Irish Question After the Outbreak of War 
in 1914: Some Unfinished Party Business,” thoroughly explains the legislative 
components of the Home Rule Bill of 1912, and how the Liberal Party responded to the 
outbreak of World War I.17 It provides a clear picture of the two months after the 
outbreak of World War One from the British perspective. Although these seemed to be 
domestic British affairs, and thus outside the purview of this thesis, nonetheless this 
journal article makes clear the heavy weight of Irish American opinion in regards to 
public policy formation in Britain.  
In the United States, the Clan na Gael was starting to carry significant social and 
cultural weight. M. Alison Kibler’s study of “the Practical Censorships of McFadden’s 
Row of Flats…” traces the Clan na Gael-organized protests based on the play’s 
                                                     
17 Patricia Jalland and John Stubbs, “The Irish Question After the Outbreak of War in 
1914: Some Unfinished Party Business,” The English Historical Review, Volume 96, 
Number 381 (October 1981) pp. 778-807 
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characterization of the Irish as lowly beasts/drunk slatterns. Ultimately, the Irish 
American community forced the producers of the play to edit out particularly offensive 
characteristics and props, leading the Irish Americans to boast they “had practically 
censored” McFadden’s Row of Flats out of existence.18 The maturity and organization of 
these protests is significant because it means that the Clan na Gael was an effective 
social force by this time.  
The budding acceptance of the American Catholic hierarchy (overwhelmingly 
Irish) towards Irish nationalist hopes highlighted the increasing cooperation of the Clan 
na Gael with the Church. No longer outright antagonists, the clergy was becoming more 
vocal about their support of the Irish independence. The détente between Catholic Church 
and Irish American nationalists was enormously helpful to mainstream Catholics support 
of Irish independence efforts because prior Irish nationalist groups were castigated and 
expelled by the Church.  Charles T. Strauss’ journal article “God Save the Boer: Irish 
American Catholics and the South African War, 1899-1902,” reflects a more recent trend 
in studies of Irish American nationalism: how specific conflicts aided or failed Irish 
American nationalist hopes.19 This emphasis is necessary because it points to the growing 
political exertions of Irish Americans, particularly the Clan na Gael, on behalf of Ireland 
                                                     
 
18 M. Alison Kibler, “Pigs, Green Whiskers, and Drunken Widows: Irish Nationalists and 
the ‘Practical Censorships’ of ‘McFadden’s Row of Flats’ in 1902 and 1903,” Journal of 
American Studies, Volume 42, Number 3 Film and Popular Culture (December 2008), pp. 
489-514 
19 Charles T. Strauss, “God Save the Boer: Irish American Catholics and the South 
African War, 1899-1902,” U.S. Catholic Historian, Volume 26, Number 4 Politics (Fall 
2008), pp. 1-28 
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in America. Where this journal succeeds is in illuminating the wealth of anti-Anglo 
sentiment and how the Clan na Gael capitalized on the ready parallel between their own 
“British subjugation” and the plight of the Boers in South Africa.  Taken as a whole, the 
maturation of the Clan na Gael was reflected in the more extensive social and cultural 
roles they assumed. By 1912, the Clan was poised to marshal and to mobilize their social, 
cultural and political capital in a final push for Irish independence.   
Thomas J. Rowland’s “Irish-American Catholics and the Quest For Respectability 
in the Coming of the Great War, 1900-1917” provided a more current example of 
assimilationist theory. Rowland joins notable Irish historian Thomas Brown in his 
assessment of an Irish Catholic immigrant driven by “a quest for respectability.”20 This 
article was most helpful for its analysis of Catholicism not as an impediment, but as a 
means to supercharge one’s patriotism. This argument can also be used to examine Irish 
American attitudes towards neutrality, formed by Irish American weeklies such as the 
Gaelic American, in the years directly preceding American entrance into World War One.       
Recent scholarship trends have emphasized the religious aspect of Irish-American 
nationalism, or the Irish American labor history, or explored micro-communities via 
statistical data.21 These studies have all contributed to a deeper understanding of the Irish 
American experience at turn of the twentieth century. However, a gap in the scholarship 
                                                     
20 Thomas J. Rowland, “Irish-American Catholics and the Quest for Respectability in the 
Coming of the Great War, 1900-1917,” Journal of Ethnic History, Volume 15, Number 2 
(Winter 1996) p. 3-31  
21 See David M. Emmons, The Butte Irish: Class and Ethnicity in an American Mining 
Town, 1875-1925, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990). Also Michael L. Mullan, 
Opposition, Discipline and Culture: The Civic World of the Irish and Italians in 
Philadelphia, 1880-1920, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2009). Also Timothy J. 
Meagher, Inventing Irish America: Generation, Class, and Ethnic Identity in a New 
England City, 1880-1928. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001)   
16 
 
exists. There is still no extended examination of just the Clan na Gael in the same time 
frame. As the primary resistance group of Irish American nationalists in this period, their 
influence must be analyzed to further the conversation surrounding opposition voices and 
agitation. The current political environment makes such studies even more timely. This 
project contributes to the historical dialogue surrounding Irish American nationalism, 
activism, and resistance.  
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          CHAPTER ONE 
         SHIFTING CURRENTS (1912) 
 
 
Ireland’s Irish Literary Revival of the earliest twentieth century was spearheaded 
by a renaissance in Gaelic culture- and William Butler Yeats and J.M. Synge were 
leading lights of this new force in literature, language, theatre, and sport. When the 
Abbey Theatre, the newly founded National Theatre of Ireland, toured America in 1911-
1912, they presented J.M. Synge’s The Playboy of the Western World to American 
audiences for the first time. Synge’s play was set in a pub in County Mayo in modern 
Ireland, and featured patricide, a love affair, pub brawls, and Synge’s faithful capture of 
Irish dialect and language. But Irish Americans were not as taken with Synge’s portrayal 
of the Irish, and bristled at the stereotypical “stage Irishman” they saw on stage. Rowdy 
demonstrations accompanied the play wherever it was presented, and police were 
summoned to provide security for the play’s performances. When the play arrived in 
Philadelphia, the head of the Clan na Gael’s District Two, Joseph McGarrity, fired the 
opening salvo. Rising from his theatre seat, McGarrity shouted “I protest against this play 
which is a libel on Irish character and a gross misrepresentation of Irish peasant life!” In 
New York City, the Clan’s protest was commanded by none other than John Devoy, ex-
Fenian and now-Clan na Gael leader. Despite the strong police presence, Devoy 
challenged the theatre and all in it. At the closing of the first act, Devoy erupted from his 
seat and roared, “Son of a bitch, that’s not Irish!” At this cue, rotten vegetables strafed 
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the stage, hurled by complicit Clan audience members. Joseph McGarrity summed up the 
Clan’s position towards the play, insisting, “There was nothing in the play that would 
cause anyone who would witness it to have love or admiration for the people or the 
country represented in it. If the Playboy is art to hell with art and those who create it.” 22 
 The first decade of the twentieth century revealed a nearly defunct Clan na Gael. 
Fractured deeply in the late 1880s and 1890s by internecine fighting, and charges of 
treachery and corruption, the Clan had recently stitched itself back together through the 
indefatigable efforts of John Devoy, Daniel Cohalan, Joseph McGarrity, and others. 
Created to aid and abet revolutionary efforts in Ireland, specifically the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood (IRB), the Clan did not content itself with merely funneling money to the 
IRB, but chose to pursue an activist path to influence any issue affecting Irish Americans. 
Whether cultural, social, economic or political- the Clan na Gael had an opinion. These 
opinions were most visible in Devoy’s New York City weekly, the Gaelic American. 
Founded in 1903, and edited by Devoy, the weekly was immediately the preferred 
trumpet of the Clan. Devoy biographer Terry Golway illuminated the crucial difference 
between the Gaelic American and other ethnic newspapers, noting that the Gaelic 
American was not a model promoting assimilation, focused on “erudite analyses of 
European politics and dispatches from various lands struggling under Britain’s yoke… 
written and edited for educated and highly literate leaders of Irish America.”23 Devoy and 
the Clan utilized the Gaelic American to influence the upper strata of Irish American 
society, compatriots who could better operate the levers of power on behalf of Irish 
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independence. As the Clan grew slowly but steadily, its efforts became assured enough to 
attempt to influence political elites like Congressman William Bourke Cockran, and the 
presidential election of 1912. While it seemed patently clear that a successful Home Rule 
bill would kill the organization, the Clan fought tooth and nail to defeat it, and had some 
unlikely allies. In this chapter, I argue 1912 proved to be a critical pivot point for the 
Clan and for the Irish independence movement. Devoy and the Clan’s relentless efforts 
led the Irish American republican resistance by threading together cultural recognition, 
political activism, and public relations in one massive mobilization effort. In 1912, the 
tide of moderate Irish-American opinion was incrementally and gradually shifting to a 
republican vision for Ireland. In four short years, the tide would be running swiftly for an 
independent Ireland.  
The presidential election of 1912 preoccupied the Clan’s domestic political 
activism, and the Clan sought to take advantage of the candidates’ increasing awareness 
of Irish American voting power. Irish Americans historically voted Democratic, but the 
presidential candidates all made efforts to woo the bloc’s votes. Incumbent Republican 
President William Howard Taft attended a 1910 Chicago St. Patrick’s Day celebration 
held by the Irish Fellowship Club. It was the first time a sitting president attended a St. 
Patrick’s Day observance.  Two years later, ex-President Theodore Roosevelt, now 
running as the Bull Moose Party’s candidate, attended a lunch held in London’s 
Westminster Palace by Irish Party leader John Redmond and other Irish Members of 
Parliament. John Redmond and the Irish Party believed in a constitutional, parliamentary 
solution to the Irish Question, but did not advocate  Roosevelt’s presence signaled a 
victory for Irish respectability, and “for the first time since the 1880s, Irish Americans 
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merited the attention of national figures.”24 The Roosevelt/Redmond lunch was 
orchestrated by Irish American nationalist Patrick Egan, a key figure in the United Irish 
League of America (UIL), Redmond’s American outreach organization. The Democratic 
Party candidate, Woodrow Wilson, once championed a British federation that would 
permit the national aspirations of the Irish, Welsh, and Scots. However, the national 
spotlight forced Wilson into a blander position; while campaigning for president, Wilson 
made no official statement regarding Ireland’s position within the British Empire.25 In 
1910-1911, the majority of all Americans viewed the Irish question through a pro-Anglo 
lens, believing that if the Irish question was successfully and peacefully resolved, it 
would lead to a better diplomatic partnership with Great Britain.26 Irish American opinion 
was more nuanced. However, a Home Rule Bill would also serve to defuse the agitations 
of the Irish American political bloc by “robbing them of their greatest issue.”27 The Clan 
na Gael mobilized public opinion to agitate for Irish independence, a more radical 
political step than Home Rule. The presidential election of 1912 allowed the Clan na 
Gael to first, put the Irish Question into the broader political discourse, and second, exert 
pressure on presidential candidates who best supported the republican Irish position. The 
Clan’s efforts in the 1912 presidential election marked their first assured attempts at 
political influence on a national level.              
 Woodrow Wilson’s election in 1912 alarmed the Clan na Gael leadership. 
Wilson’s “internationalism” troubled Devoy and his deputy, Judge Daniel Cohalan, for it 
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spoke of greater cooperation with Great Britain at the expense of the nationalist 
aspirations of Ireland.28 Wilson’s private secretary, Joseph Tumulty, himself an Irish-
American, “recorded in his memoirs that Wilson was honestly concerned with Irish self-
government.” 29 Wilson biographer John Milton Cooper, Jr. endorses this belief, arguing 
that Wilson was in fact less Anglocentric than is generally believed, despite his “Scottish 
heritage, English-born mother, Anglophilic literary tastes and long-standing admiration 
for British political institutions.”30 Wilson’s concerns were mainly domestic, however, 
and he focused on overhauling the Federal Reserve, tariff reform and anti-trust 
legislation. With the exception of the Mexican intervention in 1912, Wilson was not 
particularly invested in foreign policy until the outbreak of World War One.  
 Although scholarship leans to the consensus school of Wilson as irredeemable 
racist, there was an undeniable undertow of nativism pulsing throughout all of America in 
the first decades of the twentieth century. In that sense, President Wilson was not alone in 
his belief in  Anglo-Saxon primacy. Assimilation, for Wilson and others, meant 
subsuming whatever ethnic qualities and loyalties one retained into the greater good of 
being “American.” President-elect Wilson campaigned on “a national policy of exclusion. 
The whole question is one of assimilation of diverse races. We cannot make a 
homogenous population of people who do not blend with the Caucasian race.” 31 While 
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the greatest loathing seemed aimed at non-whites, Irish-Americans and German-
Americans were also victims. Nativists decried the ethnic clusters in cities, and also 
pointed at the influence of the Roman Catholic Church with many of these newer 
immigrants. It wasn’t just point of origin that concerned nativists, for in their estimation a 
true American was of necessity Protestant.  What historian Alexander DeConde termed 
“hyphenate hysteria” was a reiteration of the nativists’ old complaint that immigrants 
kept themselves aloof, making it more difficult to assimilate. The “hyphenate” referred to 
groups like the Irish and Germans in particular, who self-identified as “Irish-American” 
or “German-American,” implying that they were unwilling to loosen the ties that bound 
them to their mother country. And if that were the case, how could these groups ever 
hope to be considered “Americans?” Perhaps more importantly, the nativists could claim 
that these groups self-isolated, and thus were responsible for the charges of “divided 
loyalties.” This theme continued and grew more prevalent as the clouds of war gathered 
in Europe.  
The Clan na Gael, hardly fans of Wilson’s to begin with, chose to pursue an 
activist agenda that emphasized their Irishness, rather than diminished it. For Devoy and 
the Clan, this took the practical path of pursuing alliances with other maligned ethnic 
groups, particularly the Germans. As the two largest immigrant groups in America, it was 
a sensible and pragmatic matter to combine their powers as voting blocs into one super-
alliance. Speaking at a joint rally held by German-Americans and Irish-Americans at 
New York’s Cooper Union in 1911, Devoy claimed “We love America more than we 
hate England, and it is our love for America which governs our actions…”32 Post 
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Victorian Age, America and Britain’s diplomatic relations grew steadily closer, rejecting 
the efforts of Irish American nationalists to exploit any conflicts they could for Irish gain. 
Devoy argued that greater diplomatic cooperation with Britain was inimical to American 
interests, not just Irish: one of his shrewdest political moves.  This served multi-purposes: 
Devoy could successfully rebut the charges of nativists about “divided loyalties,” he 
could remind Americans of the forefathers’ warnings against “foreign entanglements,” 
and he could remind Americans that any European wars should stay in Europe. Had 
Devoy inserted and promoted Ireland’s cause as a primary goal- he would have 
undoubtedly opened himself up to exactly the same charges that dogged other immigrant 
groups. For Devoy to hide behind the red, white, and blue of the American flag versus the 
golden harp of Ireland was not only ironic, but also cunning.  
The Clan na Gael methodically and carefully maintained public visibility for the 
Irish nationalist cause through their sustained use of the media and public relations 
campaigns. However, the Clan’s assured political posture in 1912 belied their actual 
strength. Although the group was steadily gaining grounds in membership and influence, 
it remained a secret organization with oath-bound members. The men of the Clan (no 
females were permitted) were often also members of the Ancient Order of Hibernians, the 
Friendly Sons of St. Patrick, and other “open” Irish American fraternal organizations. 
“Infiltrating” these public organizations, the Clan members facilitated and executed their 
own resistance strategies on behalf of Irish independence. Similarly, the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood members “infiltrated” the Irish separatist political party Sinn Féin, giving 
the party a decidedly more republican cast than Arthur Griffith, the founder, intended. 
Dual memberships in “open” and “secret” societies allowed the Clan and the IRB to 
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influence public opinion via the press, public rallies, direct lobbying efforts, and 
fundraising. Unfortunately for the Clan and the IRB, however, their necessary “secret” 
status meant that they never had the funds or operating budget that would have enabled 
even greater resistance efforts. Nonetheless, the sheer amount of money flowing across 
the Atlantic to finance Irish republicanism reflected the exertions of Devoy and other 
Clan members, as well as the surprising amount of coordination with their Irish 
revolutionary counterparts. The Clan na Gael attempted to influence the public through 
their overt activities in the open fraternal societies, and their covert activities within the 
Clan.  
Devoy and the Clan maintained the drumbeat of Irish nationalism in America 
through an unremitting public relations campaign carried out in every Irish-American 
press vehicle. Devoy defended Irish-Americans and the Irish themselves, for he 
envisioned a vast Anglo conspiracy aimed at demeaning the Irish at any cost.33 Devoy 
considered the British capable of any low, especially where the Irish people were 
concerned, yet carefully cast his rhetoric in the words of a patriot, not an Irish agitator. 
From the pages of the Gaelic American, Devoy advocated his vision of “an Irish-
American community still very much at the mercy of  an ancient enemy who was 
perfectly capable of crossing the Atlantic to subvert the American republic in general and 
Irish-Americans in particular to suit the needs of empire.”34 Devoy in particular remained 
ruthless at correcting the prevailing Irish stereotypes: the stage Irishman, the drunk 
Paddy, the bog farmer. In 1902 and 1903, McFadden’s Row of Flats, a play depicting the 
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campaign for alderman waged by two immigrant saloonkeepers, set off violent protests 
by Irish nationalists in America. Although the play ran for five years, by 1902 and 1903 
the Clan na Gael was sufficiently reorganized and reenergized enough to carry out 
methodical protests within the theatre space itself. Bristling at nearly every aspect of 
McFadden’s portrayal of the Irish, the Clan encouraged its members to hurl vegetables 
and eggs on stage. Historians M. Alison Kibler and Lucy McDiarmid’s assess the newly 
resurgent Clan’s motive for protest as a calculated effort to upset “the control of culture 
exercised by the dominant class.”35 This analysis is in contrast to the older 
historiography’s emphasis on an Irish-American near obsessive quest for assimilation and 
respectability.36 This shift in interpretation emphasizes Irish American agency over 
accommodation. The response to McFadden’s Row of Flats foreshadowed the furor one 
decade later when famed poet William Butler Yeats, a leader in the Irish Literary 
Revival, brought a fellow Irishman’s play to America. J.M. Synge, a co-founder of the 
Abbey Theatre, wrote The Playboy of the Western World in the evocative Anglo-Irish 
heard and spoken in County Mayo where the play was set. Although such adherence to 
the colloquial language of Ireland should have pleased Irish nationalists, they instead 
took umbrage at the play’s representations of Irish womanhood, the Catholic Church, and 
according to Arthur Griffith, it’s insufficient politicism. Irish nationalist response to 
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“stage Irish” characterizations diverged along their political lines: while moderate groups 
like the United Irish League of America advocated boycotts, the Clan resisted in direct 
actions like disorderly conduct at the play performances.37 Competing claims for the 
mantle of Irish American leadership might have spurred the Irish American nationalists’ 
response to The Playboy of the Western World, but what cannot be disputed is the 
obvious flowering of nationalism and cultural identity that provoked both groups to act in 
defense of Irish identity. In terms of press coverage, the Clan’s rowdier response merited 
more ink. Devoy succeeded in pushing the Clan’s public relations agenda forward.  
The Gaelic Revival of the first decade of the twentieth century buttressed this 
flowering of Irish nationalism. Douglas Hyde’s Gaelic League was founded to promote 
all things Gaelic, a bid to “de-Anglicize Ireland.” The primary focus of the Gaelic League 
was linguistic. In 1903, the Clan endorsed the efforts of the Gaelic League explicitly, 
publishing a circular that stated “The work of the Gaelic League is in line with the objects 
of the Clan na Gael. It is preparing the mind of the country for the supreme effort that 
will lead to the final triumph of the Gael.”38 The Gaelic League founded a New York 
City office to support its efforts in America, and Clan executive Judge Daniel Cohalan 
served as its Chairman. The Gaelic League of Ireland sent “missions” led by envoys like 
Diarmuid Lynch to America regularly between 1900-1915, and the earlier “intellectual 
public meetings of Douglas Hyde” were eventually replaced by the “music and dancing 
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[that became] intrinsic parts of the envoys’ public meetings.”39 This change reflected the 
Irish American desire to be entertained, as well as dunned. Unfortunately, the Clan na 
Gael’s initial cooperation with the Gaelic League was soon soured by the demands of its 
members, and what seemed to be an obvious partnership devolved into an acrid, 
suspicious truce.  
 The Clan na Gael had one over-arching goal: Irish independence. The Gaelic 
League was a cultural force, not a political one. In Devoy’s mind, the Gaelic League by 
necessity needed to remain focused on the cultural revolution, not the political one. When 
Shane Leslie, a Gaelic League envoy in America, gave a speech at a fundraising event in 
1911, he inadvertently angered Devoy by referring to the necessity of education in Irish 
nationalism, a salient point of a Home Rule Bill. Any discussion anywhere of a Home 
Rule Bill was anathema to the Clan and the IRB, and moreover, was a gross overreach of 
the Gaelic League’s purported goals and messaging. Although Devoy qualified his 
criticism of Leslie by noting that Leslie “is a man of much promise,” he hastened to add 
that “he may or may not develop.”40 Devoy’s enmity extended to Douglas Hyde. In a 
letter to Daniel Cohalan, his deputy in the Clan, Devoy acidly remarked “Hyde is making 
nonsensical speeches about the Irish people having got their land and going to get their 
nationality. This is politics and the Gaelic League is supposed to be nonpolitical.”41 
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Furthermore, Devoy believed that Hyde and John Redmond were allied, although 
Redmond “does nothing for him [Hyde] and [his] friends are hostile to the League.” This 
was an interesting aside for Devoy, for why should he care about favors extended to the 
Gaelic League if they are a cultural organization, as he insists they remain?  Any overt 
“hostility” to the League, as Devoy suggested, would be counter-productive and counter-
intuitive to the aims of the Irish Party, first, and Redmond himself, second. Anything 
detrimental to Redmond was, by extension, a victory for the Clan na Gael’s republican 
organization. Promotion of the Gaelic culture would benefit the Irish Party, but naturally 
the IRB and the Clan na Gael, as well. A “Gael” spirit did not necessarily mean a 
republican or rebellious one. It certainly didn’t have to equate the two.      
Devoy bristled at Yeats’ assumption of a quasi-imprimatur of the Gaelic League, 
writing Cohalan “the worst is that Yeats has managed to fill every American editor with 
the idea that his theatre company is a product of the Gaelic League, has Hyde’s 
endorsement, and that by inference approves the ‘Playboy.’” Devoy believed that Hyde’s 
refusal to issue a denial of Yeats’ premise constituted a capitulation, and Devoy was 
ever-alert to any possible flaws or defects in others’ commitment to the cause.42 
Successful fundraising by the Gaelic League also diverted funds that could have gone to 
support the Clan’s clandestine pipeline to the IRB. Devoy complained that “the time of 
our men is continually taken up with raising money for the League, to the neglect of our 
own work.” He continued with resentment: “hardly anyone else does anything, and yet 
everything is done to please those who are hostile or indifferent and every 
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recommendation made by us or our friends is ignored.”43  Moreover, the Irish-American 
network that existed through the Clan’s efforts, according to Devoy, was continually 
tapped for resources by the Gaelic League. Although the goals of both organizations 
would seem to be complementary, Devoy drew a deep line of demarcation between the 
two, and took umbrage at the Gaelic League’s demands. For Devoy, complementary aims 
were insufficient motivations when the Clan/ IRB was the only true Irish nationalist 
group. Devoy felt as if the Clan was being marginalized, for he frostily remarked to 
Cohalan that “it is time we insist on being treated seriously. I don’t believe in attacking 
the Gaelic League, but I do believe our men ought to mind their own special business 
until we are treated with greater respect. It [the Gaelic League] has plenty of room to 
collect funds from the rich Irishmen here without keeping our men running errands for 
them and being treated as errand boys.” 44 Ultimately, the Gaelic League severed any 
connection with Yeats and the Abbey Company, for “the reliance of the Gaelic League 
on the Gaelic societies and on men like Devoy, who controlled the powerful Clan na 
Gael movement [made it obvious that] the money from America was the priority and 
those who threatened to remove that source of income had to be appeased at all costs.”45 
Devoy and the Clan succeeded in pressuring the Gaelic League into following their 
message, not the inverse. 
Although the Clan was highly politicized and vocal, its most lasting contribution 
on behalf of Irish independence was financial, not political. The opposition campaign to 
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the Root-Bryce Treaty in the Senate provided Devoy and the Clan a high-profile success 
in foreign relations activism. An entente between Britain and America, clearly evident by 
the turn of the century, alarmed Irish American nationalists, especially John Devoy and 
the Clan na Gael.46  In the Senate for ratification in early 1912, Root-Bryce was the 
legacy of President Taft’s efforts to create an arbitration agreement with Great Britain 
that stemmed from disputes that arose in Canadian/U.S.  fisheries. Devoy spearheaded 
the Clan’s opposition to the treaty, characterizing it as an attempt by England to draw the 
United States into a military alliance to counteract the growing threat posed by imperial 
Germany.47 Summoning all his talents as an organizer, Devoy led the Irish- American 
resistance to Root-Bryce. When Root- Bryce failed to pass the Senate in March of 1912, 
Devoy was exultant, and considered the political triumph “Irish America’s greatest 
victory over England.”48 Perhaps Devoy was exhilarated because this was one of the very 
few successful attempts by the Clan to intervene in foreign policy. Regardless, Devoy 
and the Clan successfully assisted in the resistance of foreign policy detrimental to the 
Irish republican strategy. The lobbying effort against Root/Bryce involved a concerted 
push directed at elite politicians- indicating the assurance with which the Irish American 
activists operated. Focusing on U.S. Senators directly, without the protective umbrella of 
party machinery like Tammany Hall in New York City, emphasized the top-down quality 
of the Clan’s activism. The opposition to Home Rule was an even more involved effort. 
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 The Clan na Gael bitterly rejected the idea of Home Rule, for it provided a 
“palliative and not a cure for the political ills of Ireland.”49 Home Rule was introduced in 
1912 by British Prime Minister Asquith. The Liberal Party majority was forced to present 
the Home Rule Bill because they owed their razor-thin edge to the Irish Party. The Clan, 
led by John Devoy and Daniel Cohalan, shifted into overdrive to counter the moderate, 
constitutional Home Rule proposal. John Redmond, the leader of the Irish Party, believed 
faithfully in a parliamentary solution to the “Irish Question.” He was supported by the 
vast majority of Irish voters, as well as Irish-Americans. Nonetheless, the Clan spurned 
Home Rule, insisting as early as 1900 “that members shall abstain from giving support, 
directly or indirectly, to the Parliamentary movement and from participation in meetings 
held for the purpose aiding that movement.”50 A follow up circular in 1901 reminded 
Clan members that “no member of our organization shall become a member of the United 
Irish League, or in any way aid or support it, or any other constitutional movement, and 
shall, as far as practicable, in every way oppose such movements.” Clearly, Redmond’s 
American outreach organization, the United Irish League, had made inroads in the Clan 
na Gael membership rolls, and thus the necessary stern rebuke to Clan members. The 
Clan remained vigilant in maintaining their militarist and separatist policy, and Devoy’s 
Gaelic American “portray[ed] Redmond as prepared to sell out the dream of the republic 
for the unacceptable compromise of Home Rule” with some success.51 By 1912, 
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Redmond could no longer depend on the open pockets of Irish Americans to help fund 
his party and its support of Home Rule. The currents of Irish nationalism were shifting.  
The activities of the Clan na Gael in 1912 marked a departure and a critical pivot 
point for the Irish nationalist cause. The Clan mounted a furious political offensive 
against the Root-Bryce Treaty, and succeeded in its resistance for Senate ratification. In 
the pages of the Gaelic American, John Devoy maintained the excellence and superiority 
of the Irish race. The Clan also executed a highly visible and successful campaign against 
“stage Irish” characterizations that dealt in stereotypes that were highly offensive, but no 
more so than those leveled at Germans or any other immigrant group. The Gaelic League 
stimulated the pride of Irish Americans and capitalized on it through fundraising tours in 
both decades of the 1900-1910s. And whether it was a case of the chicken or the egg, all 
these winds of change collided to create a new, more militant republican spirit. Although 
it would not be apparent for a few more years, in 1912 several crosscurrents in Irish 
America propelled the cause of Irish independence forward. With some highly unlikely 
allies, Ireland and Irish America moved into 1913 poised for even greater exertions, but 
ultimately greater rewards.   
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                                                      CHAPTER TWO 
 
  SWIFT WINDS AND A FOLLOWING SEA (1913-1914) 
 
 
 
 Immigration to America experienced one of its periodic surges in the first two 
decades of the twentieth century. But the new immigrants were predominantly from 
Eastern and Southern Europe. Nativists, stung by the “threat” posed by these new 
immigrants, sounded their old battle cry. However, the new nativist rhetoric was 
modernized, and took aim at “hyphenated Americans.” The term was an epithet, not a 
description- and it aimed at Americans who were of foreign birth or origin, and displayed 
an allegiance to a foreign country. On one of his periodic lobbying efforts to legislators, 
John Devoy, still a leader of the Clan na Gael in his seventies, met with Senator John 
Sharp Williams of Mississippi. When the Senator complained about “hyphenated 
Americans” to Devoy, Devoy had little use for it. Devoy pointedly asked the Senator 
“Aren’t the Anglo-Saxons hyphenated?” The Senator assented the point, but rebutted: 
“Yes, but I’m not Anglo-Saxon. I’m a Welshman. But my people have been here for a 
hundred and fifty years.” Devoy locked him with cold eyes and said “Judging by that 
standard, Sitting Bull has a better record.”52  
The Clan na Gael maintained a diverse strategy of public relations efforts, foreign 
relations activism, and continued and better coordination with the Irish Republican 
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Brotherhood. As 1913 moved into 1914, geopolitics and European alliances drew 
Britain’s attention away from the Irish question, and onto the battlefield. Home Rule 
received the royal assent in 1914, but never implemented, as the guns of World War One 
opened up. With Britain’s attention diverted to the war effort, Devoy and the Clan chose 
to ally themselves with German Americans and Germany to better improve the position 
of the Irish republican nationalists, at the expense of Redmond and his Irish Party and 
Home Rule, generally. In a twist of fate, the Clan’s efforts at obstructing Home Rule 
were aided by the militant response of the Ulster Unionists, led by Sir Edward Carson. 
The Catholic Church hierarchy in America posed Catholics as super-patriots, and the 
Irish in America joined groups such as the Knights of Columbus to rebut the nativist 
claim of “divided loyalties.” John Devoy and the Clan fought for Irish American 
inclusion, not assimilation. They did not believe that subsuming one’s ethnicity was 
necessary for being American. This policy allowed Irish Americans greater confidence in 
their political involvement as Americans, not hyphenates. This poise was evident as they 
resisted Home Rule in Ireland, and agitated for continued neutrality in America.   
 The Great War posed difficult questions for Americans during the period of 
American neutrality from 1914-1917. Loyalty to one’s mother country meant the risk of 
being branded disloyal or unpatriotic was quite real. Even remaining attached to one’s 
ethnicity via identification as an “Irish-American,” or “German-American,” became 
problematic as the push for assimilation at all costs picked up speed. For the Anglophilic 
elite, “the persistence of ethnic diversity [was] incompatible with national unity.” 
President Woodrow Wilson embodied this principle, and used the presidential pulpit in 
191 to reprimand German- and Irish-Americans, saying they “cannot become thorough 
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Americans if [they] think of [themselves] in groups…America does not consist of 
groups.”53 In response, John Devoy and the Clan reaffirmed their ethnic allegiance and 
underscored their anti-British position by promoting the German cause at every 
opportunity, particularly in the pages of the Gaelic American. Devoy made this very 
public effort “in order to neutralize the undisguised pro-British sentiments of the 
American ruling class, that bastion of Protestant, Anglo American power…[for] if the 
combined political clout of the nation’s two largest immigrant groups, the Germans and 
the Irish, could be massed together, pro- British politicians might think twice before 
committing U.S. troops to the Western Front.”54 Devoy was realist enough to know that 
completely avoiding American activity in the Great War was nearly impossible, but he 
did hope to agitate enough to make Wilson’s administration consider the ramifications of 
infuriating the two largest, and best organized voting blocs.   
Irish Catholics in America were steadily growing more confident of their place in 
the American spectrum. Aided by immigration patterns that stretched back to the 
founding of the Republic, the Irish in America were the second largest immigrant group 
behind the Germans. In short, the Irish had firm roots. In the second decade of the 
twentieth century- Southern and Eastern Europeans were the majority of new immigrants. 
Wave after wave of Italians, Poles, and Russians arrived in America through 1900-1920. 
These groups did not have the advantage of being from English-speaking countries, as the 
Irish did. Clustering in the same ethnic neighborhoods that the Irish had only recently 
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vacated as their circumstances had improved, these new immigrants retained much of 
their culture, but most particularly, their religion. They were most often Catholic.  
In another case of unlikely confederates, the Clan na Gael’s John Devoy and the 
Catholic hierarchy forged a tenuous partnership to challenge bigotry in America. The 
American Catholic hierarchy was overwhelmingly dominated by the Irish, mocked as the 
“hibernocracy.” Archbishop John Ireland (St. Paul) and James Cardinal Gibbons 
(Baltimore) led the defense of American Catholicism in the face of rising nativist 
resentment. The Clan na Gael was in no way affiliated with the Catholic Church, in fact, 
the Clan’s republicanism was anathema to the old guard both in Ireland and in America. 
Moreover, the extremism of the Fenian Brotherhood (the Clan’s precursor) had soured 
moderate Irish and Irish American opinion towards republicanism. Historian Thomas 
Rowland argues “a concern for respectability” motivated the American Catholic 
hierarchy to “suppress the more blatantly radical strains of Irish nationalism.”55 This 
conservatism was not only apparent in nationalist causes, but also labor relations, as well.  
Further, the new breed of nationalists in Ireland and in America were certain that the 
Catholic Church was responsible for keeping the Irish poor and ignorant, uncultured and 
uncouth.56 Nonetheless, Devoy and the Clan had to accept an uneasy truce with the 
“hibernocracy,” because the Clan would be dead in the water should there be an official 
disavowal on either side.     
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The Clan and the Church worked in rare tandem to promote Irish Americans as 
patriots before World War I, and during it. This self-promotion enabled the Irish 
Americans to become comfortable in political involvement, and become confident 
enough to press for inclusion, not merely assimilation. This was a more radical step than 
merely being on the defensive against nativist claims, for it implies a level of challenge 
and agency to the nativists’ allegations. For the Clan, there was no need to subsume one’s 
ethnicity on the altar of patriotism. For Cardinal Gibbons and Archbishop Ireland, the 
image American Catholics needed to project was one of industriousness, temperance, and 
patriotism. In that manner, American Catholics could contest the nativist claims of 
indolence, intemperance, and Papal allegiance over citizenship.57 However, it must be 
noted that no one could ever fully satisfy John Devoy- he had his own extreme standards. 
Devoy and the Clan had to maintain cordial relations with the Catholic Church, and press 
for greater inclusion of Irish Americans in the political and social spheres. The uneasy 
truce between the Clan and the American Catholic hierarchy did not extend to the Clan’s 
activities towards John Redmond and Home Rule.  
For the Clan na Gael, the Home Rule Bill of 1912 was totally unsatisfactory, as it 
still kept Ireland firmly tied to Britain. Anything short of independence was untenable.  
The Clan by necessity had to resist Home Rule, and by extension, John Redmond and the 
Irish Party. Redmond’s claim to speak for all of the Irish nationalists was invalid. His 
faith and optimism in a Parliamentary solution to the “Irish question” reflected his 
commitment to Ireland’s place within the Empire- and this alone disqualified him in the 
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eyes of the Clan na Gael.58 Redmond’s orthodoxy and one-dimensional analysis of the 
resistance to Home Rule meant that he severely underestimated the hostility of the 
opposition.    
The rise of the Ulster Unionist Party, led by Sir Edward Carson, was the most 
direct threat to implementation of the Bill. The participation of over 250,000 Unionists at 
a massive rally in Belfast 1912 should have indicated the sincerity and depth of the 
opposition to Home Rule, but Redmond and the Irish Party took a “dismissive 
approach… referring to it as the ‘Ulster bogey.”59 It would be a fatal flaw in Irish Party 
tactics. Redmond was also hamstrung because his support came grudgingly from a 
number of groups who saw no other plausible options, while Carson and the Ulster 
Unionists were united in common cause, and in a deeply entrenched defensive position. 
The creation of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), a military organization that drilled and 
collected weapons openly in defiance of British law, would prove catastrophic for the 
Irish Party’s insistence on fair play and constitutional implementation of Home Rule. The 
UVF was ostensibly formed to “protect” the Union, when it actually was a paramilitary 
force that promised to shed blood if Ireland was ever separated from Britain via Home 
Rule. Redmond’s approach seemed overly cautious and conservative in comparison his 
opponents’ willingness to go outside traditional means of opposition.  
The Irish Volunteer Force, the Irish nationalist force formed in response to the 
UVF, was intended to be a nationalist, not republican organization.60 In the Gaelic 
                                                     
58 Joseph P. Finnan, John Redmond and Irish Unity, 1912-1918, (Ithaca: Syracuse 
University Press, 2004), 58 
59 Finnan, John Redmond and Irish Unity, 1912-1918, 45. 
60 Ibid, 43. 
39
 
American, Devoy posed the Irish Volunteers a “national army of defense,” and called for 
Irish Americans to financially support the Volunteers.61 The Gaelic American placed 
fundraising articles for the Irish Volunteers on the front page of over half their weekly 
issues in 1914.62 For Devoy and the Clan na Gael, supporting the purchase of arms for 
the Volunteers was a far cry from the terror tactics of the early Clan’s Dynamite 
Campaign. The Dynamite Campaign of the 1880s split the Clan into two- with Devoy 
and his faction vehemently opposed to the civilian bloodshed associated with it. 
However, Devoy most assuredly supported a military insurrection against Britain. Devoy 
urged his readership to support the IVF, in front page article after front page article. The 
Irish Volunteers pointedly condemned the “‘emasculated representative politics of Home 
Rule,’ with its delays and compromises.” 63 Had Redmond protested the formation of the 
Irish Volunteers (as against good order or peaceful due process) with any vehemence, he 
would have been branded a coward at best, a traitor at worst. Neither boded well for his 
leadership. Redmond’s only recourse in this circumstance was to simply assume 
leadership of the Irish Volunteers, and hope to control it through his own political party 
apparatus. His heavy-handed assertion that “the Volunteer executive committee was not 
fully representative, and should be enlarged to allow it {for which read-force it}to 
represent the party.”64 Redmond forced the executive committee to accept 25 of his 
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handpicked men, a concession that further bruised the already tender partnership between 
Nationalist military and political groups. Two paramilitary forces now existed in Ireland.  
The official British policy of non-interference seemed particularly ineffectual 
given the highly publicized success of the UVF’s importation of over 50,000 rifles in 
April 1914. The Gaelic American noted the illegality of the UVF’s operation, and argued 
on its front page “Gun Running Connived At- British government allowed the Carsonites 
to land their arms and take them safely inland.”65 When Irish Volunteers attempted their 
own gun-running operation, albeit on a much smaller scale, at Howth, Ireland in July of 
the same year, they were intercepted by British Metropolitan Police. When the 
Metropolitan Police attempted to return to Dublin, they were followed by an angry group 
of civilians, who hurled insults, stones, and bottles indiscriminately. The police formed 
ranks, and in the confusion, the men misinterpreted an order to fire into the crowd to 
disperse them. Four civilians died. The “Bachelor’s Walk Massacre” was immediately a 
public relations nightmare for the British, for it directly contradicted the government’s 
official passivity to the same operation by the UVF.66 Such obvious bias indicated 
outright preferential treatment, and the nationalists listed increasingly towards a more 
militarized response, as opposed to the constitutional methods espoused by the Irish 
Party. The outlines of a potential civil war in Ireland seemed increasingly distinct.  
 In 1914, the Great War began in Europe, and the three years of American 
neutrality proved to be critical ones for Irish American nationalists. The Clan na Gael 
balanced on the tightrope of public opinion while remaining patriotic Americans. Now in 
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his seventies, John Devoy remained as vocal and attentive as ever. The Great War drove 
him to new exertions as Woodrow Wilson’s administration slid into a pro-Allied posture. 
In the pages of the Gaelic American, Devoy trumpeted the absolute necessity of 
neutrality to his predominantly  northeastern readership. On February 2nd, Devoy 
rhetorically asked “Is England to Run the United States?” on the front page of the Gaelic 
American, hoping to fan the flames of American independence, not acquiescence to 
British foreign policy programming.67 The collaboration of Irish and German Americans, 
rooted in their common enmity towards Britain, became deeper still. The same 
collaboration also existed in Europe, where Irish nationalists were involved in delicate 
negotiations with German envoys, both seeking to wound Britain. In America, John 
Devoy and a delegation of Clan members including Joseph McGarrity formally met with 
the German consul general in New York. The Clan group “formally proposed to align the 
Irish-American movement with Germany on behalf of the Irish Republican Brotherhood 
in Dublin.”68 
 Any blow to Redmond was a boon to the Clan, and the members of the Executive 
Council of the Clan renewed their efforts at resisting Redmond’s policies, and reasserted 
their pro-German program. The beginning of WWI had temporarily shelved the Home 
Rule bill, but the Clan remained opposed to a constitutional solution to the Irish question 
that did not mean Ireland’s independence. Redmond saw Britain’s entry in the war as a 
bright opportunity to demonstrate Ireland’s fealty to the Empire, which would allay 
Unionist fears of Home Rule and thus ensure its peaceful implementation. Redmond 
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encouraged the Irish Volunteers to enlist in the British army, a political move that 
inflamed Irish nationalists. The Irish Volunteers were a domestic defense force created in 
response to Ulster’s arming, not a national guard to be mustered in Britain’s war effort. 
For Redmond to urge the Irish Volunteers to sacrifice themselves for Britain rather than 
Ireland seemed the height of accommodation, not to mention tone-deaf. Nonetheless, 
Redmond promised the Volunteers to the Allied manpower effort. This provoked a split 
between a faction led by Eoin MacNeill and Padraig Pearse (numbering about 12,000 
members) and those loyal to Redmond. The Clan, anti-Redmond to begin with, 
vigorously rebutted the suggestion that he and he alone spoke for Irish nationalists. The 
Clan took particular issue with using the Volunteers in a European war, and contended 
“Ireland had no quarrel with Germany…and the young manhood of Ireland should stay at 
home and out of His Majesty’s bloodied uniforms.”69 Patrick Ford’s Irish World, once a 
bastion of support for Redmond, became increasingly hostile towards him. The Irish 
World provided the most widely circulated media for the Home Rule position, and had 
unwaveringly supported Redmond prior to World War I. However, even the Irish World 
exhibited the shift in public opinion towards Redmond’s war-time policies. “Ireland, the 
paper felt, had no obligation to fight for England and Redmond had no power from the 
Irish people to act as a British recruiting agent.”70 Going further still, the paper “refused 
to accept the notion that the war, which it saw as one of continental rivalries, in any way 
effected Ireland’s vital interests.” 71 The majority Irish American support for Redmond 
started waning. In another ominous sign, President Michael Ryan of the United Irish 
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League in America wrote to Redmond telling him that he felt the UIL was no longer 
necessary, as Home Rule had received royal assent in September of 1914. The UIL and 
the Irish World were two Redmondite stalwarts, and their withdrawal of support was 
another indication that moderate, mainstream support in Irish America for Redmond was 
slipping. The volume of the resistance to Redmond and Home Rule was most assuredly 
noticeable, for Dr. John G. Coyle, replacement president after Michael Ryan’s 
resignation, reported to Redmond that “the noise and clamor made [by the Irish-German 
groups] were quite capable of making the American public think that all the Irish were 
pro-German and anti-Redmond.”72 Obviously, the Clan’s marketing campaign was 
bearing new fruit.     
 In 1914, Sir Roger Casement, an Anglo-Irish knight of the British Empire, 
became a high-profile, vocal state actor for Irish nationalism. A “trophy convert,” 
Casement was famous for his humanitarian work in the Belgian Congo.73 In 1913, 
Casement published an anonymous article in Thomas MacDonough’s Irish Review that 
received critical praise from Irish nationalists. His Irish nationalism was of the 
revolutionary sort, and he was one of the founders of the Irish Volunteers. His 
relationship with the Clan na Gael began in July of 1914 as a result of his mission to 
raise money to buy arms for the Volunteers. The Irish Volunteers lacked weapons, 
particularly in comparison to the well-armed Ulster Volunteer Force. After the split over 
Redmond’s coup, the remaining minority Volunteer group led by Pearse and MacNeill 
was desperately dependent on American money to purchase guns. The Irish Republican 
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Brotherhood and Clan na Gael stepped into the breach and publicized fundraising efforts 
for the Volunteers. In October, Casement returned to the United States, this time on a 
much more delicate exercise. He proposed to go “to Berlin and act as the Irish 
movement’s ambassador and lobbyist, and to raise a brigade made up of Irish prisoners-
of-war in German camps.”74 The sinews binding the German and Irish and American 
conspiracy grew tighter. 
 In 1913 and 1914 the Clan na Gael faced the awesome task of marshalling 
resistance to the third Home Rule Bill read in Parliament. This Home Rule Bill was 
massively popular within the moderate Irish American community, as well as the 
majority of the Irish populace. The Catholic Church also supported Home Rule as it 
aligned with their political conservatism in Ireland. In a strange twist of fate, the Clan na 
Gael was joined in opposition by a most unlikely ally: the Ulster Unionists. It was a case 
of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Ulster Unionists, led by Sir Edward Carson, 
flatly refused the premise of Home Rule, demanding that Ireland remain a part of the 
Union. Although there could obviously be no collaboration, both the Clan and the Ulster 
Unionists were both wholly engaged in defeating the Home Rule Bill from their 
respective positions.  
The Clan na Gael also had to combat the anti-Catholic bias still prevalent in the 
earliest twentieth century, without revealing their ambivalence, if not outright hostility, 
towards the official Catholic Church and its hierarchy. The Clan na Gael championed a 
policy of inclusion, not assimilation, to galvanize Irish American resistance to John 
Redmond, Home Rule and American participation in World War I. The Clan’s insistence 
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on an equal Irish American claim to being “patriotic Americans” undoubtedly created 
more animated, involved ethnic activists. In 1915, these new winds of patriotism, 
identity, participation, and resistance would all assemble into one great movement.    
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CHAPTER THREE 
       AN INCOMING TIDE (1915) 
 
At 73, John Devoy was struggling to keep up with his own murderous pace. He 
was one of the last living Fenians. His prolific correspondence with dozens of people 
necessitated switching to a typewriter as he grew older. His eyesight weakened, and his 
hearing was nearly gone. In 1915, his Fenian blood brother, Jeremiah O’Donovan Rossa, 
died a feeble death. Recently reconciled after decades of bitter estrangement, the Rossa 
and Devoy reconnection was forged by Rossa’s wife, who reminded Devoy of their 
shared past: “I think if you would come and talk of your earlier hopes and labours 
together… it would do him a world of good. He has a simple and loving heart, and you 
were very dear to it long ago.” The reunion of Devoy and Rossa was mirrored in the 
rapprochement in the Irish Volunteers for Rossa’s funeral. Irish past and present was 
being forged into one vital movement. Devoy was now the last of the old breed.   
In America, the continued exertions of the Clan na Gael in three distinct segments 
continued to pressure American opinion on the Irish question. A fiery public relations 
campaign fed with constant pro-German publications, demonstrations, and fundraisers 
galvanized Irish Americans. The Clan took advantage of the growing Irish republican 
fervor that was quickly replacing the moderate, Home Rule nationalists through activism 
aimed at opposition to Redmond and his dedication to the Allies, and continued 
collaboration with the IRB. John Redmond’s pro-Empire activities put him at direct odds 
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with a growing number of Irish, and Irish Americans. For the first three years of World 
War I, America’s neutrality was a hot-button issue in a nation of so many immigrants 
who hailed from the participating countries. To counteract a pro-Allied bias in the media, 
John Devoy and the Gaelic American argued that Germany was actually Ireland’s best 
hope for independence. Former Fenian Jeremiah O’Donovan Rossa’s funeral in the 
summer of 1915 provided the rousing symbolism and rhetoric that emboldened this 
revolutionary undertaking, and awakened a complacent Irish American middle class. The 
massive demonstration at Madison Square Garden in the same summer showed the depth 
of a new mobilization for the Irish independence movement. The events of 1912-1914 
provided the current for a militant Irish nationalism. 1915 developed the current into a 
tide. The Clan na Gael capitalized on the collision of several outside forces to create the 
best possible situation for the Irish republican movement to exploit.  
 The Clan na Gael sustained its public relations onslaught on the Irish American 
public to counteract a pro-Anglo bias in American media in 1915. Primarily utilizing the 
Gaelic American and now joined by the Irish World, the Clan promoted a radical pro-
German position, not just neutrality. They also blasted the “pecuniary” motivations of the 
defense manufacturers who profited from war, and the big banking houses that provided 
the loans to float the war effort for the Allies.75  The Gaelic American highlighted the 
Kaiser’s Catholic chaplains as exemplars to better contrast the Protestant Allies. The 
Clan’s campaign was aided by the publication of many pamphlets and short monographs, 
such as Frank Koester’s The Lies of the Allies,76 Sir Roger Casement’s The Crime 
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Against Europe: A Possible Outcome of the War of 1914,77 and Edward Steiner’s The 
Confession of a Hyphenated American.78 Former Syracuse, New York mayor James K. 
McGuire contributed two widely read books: What Could Germany Do For Ireland?79 
and The King, The Kaiser, and Irish Freedom80. Headlines from the Gaelic American in 
January 1915 trumpet the anti-Allied position, blaring: “Illegal Recruiting Done in the 
British Consulate,”81 and “England and Her Allies Are Supplied With Munitions of War 
and American Maritime Commerce Severely Affected.”82   
Augmenting the media blitz, the Clan focused on impressive demonstrations to 
resist pro-Allied sympathies. By early 1915, President Wilson’s approval of vast loans to 
fund the Allies drew America ever closer to the Allied side, no matter his official 
proclamations of neutrality. Most frequently working in tandem with German groups, a 
massive public pro-neutrality rally was held on June 24, 1915 at Madison Square Garden. 
A jubilant John Devoy claimed attendance numbers inside and outside the Garden at 
100,000, while the New York Police Department put the gate closer to 75,000.83 Either 
way, it was a highly effective gathering. The German American/ Irish American coalition 
had successfully courted William Jennings Bryan as their featured speaker, a coup for 
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their demonstration. Recently resigned as Secretary of State for Woodrow Wilson, 
Bryan’s passionate pacifism was no longer in tandem with Wilson’s foreign policy. The 
day after his resignation was made public, Bryan remained hopeful of his influence, 
saying, “I believe I can do more on the outside to prevent war than I can do on the 
inside… I can work to direct public opinion so it will not exert pressure for extreme 
action.”84 Bryan quickly followed through on his promise to “direct public opinion,” for 
the Madison Square Garden rally was less than one month from his resignation. Bryan 
reminded the crowd gathered:  
There is no reason why any citizen of this country should desire war,  
and I am sure the number of those who actually do desire it is infinitesimally 
small.  
This class is made up of those who have a pecuniary interest in war and of those 
who regard war as a moral stimulant. Outside of the class actually desiring war, 
there is a somewhat larger class whose members, while opposing war as a general 
proposition  
and desiring peace in the abstract, magnify international differences. They believe 
that 
a nation’s prestige requires it to constantly reiterate its willingness and readiness 
to  
resort to force.85    
 
Bryan’s remarks revealed his perception of American public opinion. He neatly 
drew a line between the majority of Americans who did not desire war, and those who 
saw America’s global position as an imperative to intervention. For John Devoy and the 
Clan, as well as the German-American interest groups, netting a high-profile, elite 
politician like William Jennings Bryan was a public relations victory guaranteed to get 
heavy press coverage outside the realm of the ethnic weeklies and media. Five days after 
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the Madison Square Garden rally, another public relations opportunity presented itself 
with the death of Fenian Jeremiah O’Donovan Rossa. O’Donovan Rossa’s funeral 
provided all the symbolism and spirituality that fed the new revolutionary spirit.  
O’Donovan Rossa spent his final years an incoherent, raving, feeble man. Once 
the closest of conspirators, he and Devoy were bitterly estranged over the Clan’s 
Dynamite Campaign of the 1880s.86 They had not spoken since, until Rossa’s wife 
pleaded with Devoy to visit him as his senility advanced. Devoy relented, and was a 
regular visitor at his bedside until his death on June 29, 1915. He was 83. Devoy, ever the 
pragmatist, cabled Thomas Clarke in Dublin:   ‘“Rossa dead. What shall we do?”  
      “Send his body home at once,” came the reply.’87 
 
The Clan moved swiftly to capitalize on the publicity surrounding O’Donovan 
Rossa’s death: the most significant practical indication of the new martial spirit in Ireland 
was the rapprochement of the Irish Volunteers into one body for O’Donovan Rossa’s 
funeral. As a former Fenian, Rossa’s funeral was guaranteed a good turnout by the Irish 
and Irish American republican groups. His endorsement of the “Dynamite Campaign” 
lost him many of his tightest circle in the late 1880s, but in death all was forgiven- even 
Rossa’s tepid endorsement of Redmond. Ultimately, Rossa was embraced by all Irish 
nationalists, not just republican ones. It was the first time that the Irish Volunteers and the 
National Volunteers operated in tandem since their acrimonious split in 1914. They 
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bridged their differences to honor a shared hero of Irish nationalism. The grave-side 
oration by Padraig Pearse, commander of the Irish Volunteers, became a defining 
proclamation of the revolutionaries in Ireland and in America. Rossa’s unrepentant 
Fenian past, the thousands who honored his passing, all were fodder for the Clan’s 
unrelenting public relations campaign. It was nearly a benediction for the Irish 
revolutionary nationalists.  
 No strangers to symbolism, the Irish Americans held a funeral mass in St. Peter’s 
Church on Staten Island before shipping Rossa to his final resting place in Dublin’s 
Glasnevin Cemetery. According to the Irish Times report the following day, the Dublin 
funeral procession was lengthy, somber, and well-organized. Pearse’s revolutionary 
nationalism exalted both O’Donovan Rossa and the Irish nationalist cause. His words 
would provide the clarion call for a coming revolution: 
I may be taken as speaking on behalf of a new generation that has been re-
baptised in the Fenian faith, and that has accepted the responsibility of carrying 
out the Fenian programme… We of the Irish Volunteers, and you others who are 
associated with us in to-day’s task and duty, are bound together and must stand 
together henceforth in brotherly union for the achievement of the freedom of 
Ireland… we pledge to Ireland our love, and we pledge to English rule in Ireland 
our hate… The Defenders of this Realm have worked well in secret and in the 
open. They think that they have pacified Ireland. They think that they have 
purchased half of us and intimidated the other half. They think that they have 
foreseen everything, think that they have provided against everything; but the 
fools, the fools, the fools!– they have left us our Fenian dead; and while Ireland 
holds these graves, Ireland unfree shall never be at peace.88 
The Clan’s promise to help arm the Irish Volunteers resulted in fundraising 
efforts publicized in the Gaelic American. Much of 1914’s Gaelic American front pages 
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kept the call for dollars forefront in Irish American consciousness. By 1915, the Gaelic 
American made their anti-Redmond rhetoric front-page news just as often as their 
fundraising for the Volunteers. The first issue of 1915’s Gaelic American set the tone: 
“TRAITORS AND INFORMERS HELP THE ENGLISH,” with the sub-heading 
“Redmond Lost To Even A Sense of Shame.”89 While resistance to Home Rule was a 
particular focus of the Clan na Gael, Redmond’s efforts on behalf of British recruitment 
were also deemed a priority for resistance. Irish blood should not be shed in a European 
war. The Gaelic American emphasized the senseless loss of life in a British army for Irish 
enlistees, promising readers “Regiments Wiped Out, Reinforced by Drafts From Home 
and Then Slaughtered Again…”90 Ireland’s nationalists did not enlist in the British army, 
however, a decided disavowal of John Redmond’s earnest recruiting efforts. Redmond 
and the Irish Party realized that much of their war policy centered on the enlistment issue.  
If Ireland’s nationalists refused to enlist, it would smack of disloyalty to the war effort, 
and point to a further divergence from the Empire. These were twin pillars of Redmond’s 
optimistic war policy, because patriotic support of the war was supposed to ensure the 
good faith necessary for implementation of Home Rule. When the Irish Volunteers split 
in 1914, the National Volunteers (Redmond’s vastly larger majority group) suffered from 
Redmond’s decision to keep them a political wing of his Irish Party, whereas the Irish 
Volunteers were militarily minded, deeply influenced by their IRB infiltration, and more 
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radicalized by Redmond’s continued fealty to British war policy. To be sure, it was not 
just Irish Volunteers who were disillusioned by Redmond’s war-time strategy.  
Redmond’s efforts on behalf of enlistment repelled more and more moderate Irish 
Americans, the exact demographic Redmond relied on. For the Irish at home, and the 
Irish in America, Redmond’s endeavors on behalf of British recruiting were folly at best, 
and treachery at worst. The enlistment crisis also forced Prime Minister Asquith’s hand, 
for the manpower demands of World War I forced a reckoning with the “Irish Question.” 
The Irish viewed enlistment with scorn, for why serve for a government that refused to 
implement any measure of self-rule? World War I was regarded as Britain’s fight, not 
Ireland’s- a further step towards a republicanism. Worse yet, if voluntary enlistments 
failed to keep pace with the manpower demands of wartime, conscription would be 
enacted. Travis Crosby, a Lloyd George biographer, notes that Asquith’s reaction to the 
enlistment/ conscription crisis was tortuous, even for Asquith, explaining “he appointed 
committee after committee during the conscription debate, perhaps as a delaying tactic to 
introduce conscription slowly. Or perhaps it was a device to keep him in the game with 
the hope the conscriptionist chorus would slowly die down.” 91 His “wait-and-see” 
approach failed miserably again, and he was forced to fashion a partial conscription bill 
in January 1916. It passed overwhelmingly, though the Irish Nationalists provided more 
than one-half the opposing votes. The Liberals had to accept that winning the war was the 
ultimate goal, not Liberal principles.92 Tellingly, recruitment in Ireland stalled all across 
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the board by 1916, with Ireland ultimately contributing less than 6% of its male 
population- the lowest number in the British Empire.93 The formation of the war-time 
coalition British government hastened this process. 
The pressures of war, the unrelenting bloodbath on the Western Front, the 
disastrous Dardanelles campaign, all combined with a severe munitions shortage forced a 
reshuffling of the British government. Asquith’s coalition government, formed in May 
1915, was staffed with Home Rule’s staunchest opponents. Asquith remained prime 
minister, and the majority of his cabinet were avowed enemies of Home Rule. The 
position of attorney-general went to Sir Edward Carson, a nod to his importance within 
the Conservative Party. John Redmond was offered a post, but it was a non-political one: 
postmaster-general. Redmond rejected the offer, because it was a) bad politics to accept 
any British offer while Home Rule was still hanging in the balance, and b) as he 
reminded Asquith, “from the Irish point of view [inclusion of Carson in the Cabinet] 
would do infinite harm and make our efforts to help [with the war] far more difficult.”94 
The new cabinet reflected a resurgent Conservative Party in Britain, but the real issue for 
the Irish was the importance of the posts: Carson’s post was by far the more influential. 
The incongruity of offering Redmond postmaster-general, and Carson attorney-general 
did not bother Asquith.  For Irish Americans, the coalition government was yet another 
example of British perfidy- for where was the representative nationalist Irish if Sir 
Edward Carson, the face of the Ulster Unionists, was Cabinet level? Were both positions 
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not equally deserving of representation? Padraig Pearse wrote Joseph McGarrity, 
updating him of the situation in Ireland:  
 
You have seen by this that we have what is termed a coalition war ministry 
and Redmond will not be in a position to make Asquith toe the line and it is 
very likely we might say goodbye to the Home Rule Bill. Conscription will  
be the next and the Lord knows what its consequences will be as I am inclined 
 to think many of the Irish will resist at the very outset.95 
 
 
The creation of the coalition government served to emphasize the ever-greater 
disparity in treatment between the Unionists and the Irish nationalists, and Redmond 
increasingly became the target of disdain, even amongst his once-ardent supporters in 
Ireland and in Irish America. From their safe haven across the Atlantic, more radical Irish 
American voices started to outstrip the moderate, constitutional Home Rulers in Ireland 
and in America. The Clan actually had to join the fray in order to direct protests that were 
now evident all over the Irish American spectrum, not merely in radical republican Irish 
American circles.96  
At Woodenbridge, County Wicklow- Redmond spoke to a group of Volunteers and 
exhorted them to fight for the Allied cause: 
…It would be a disgrace forever to our country, and a reproach to her manhood, 
 and a denial of the lessons of our history, if young Ireland confined her efforts to 
remaining at home to defend the shores of Ireland from an unlikely invasion and 
 to shrink from the duty of approval on the field of battle.97 
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Redmond’s war-time policy of accommodation to the British at the expense of 
Home Rule, exemplified by his speech at Woodenbridge, disappointed many Irish 
Americans. The “defection” of New York City’s Irish World right after Redmond’s 
Woodenbridge speech further marginalized the moderate Irish American nationalist 
position to the Irish question. The Irish World was one of Redmond’s staunchest 
supporters, and was counted on to be the voice for Redmond’s policy in America.  Post-
Woodenbridge speech, the United Irish League in America (UILA), a Redmond outreach 
group, also defected from its pro-Redmond/ Home Rule position. Michael Ryan, the 
UILA president, “refused to endorse the Allied cause,” and by 1915 the League’s 
treasurer reported to Redmond “there is no money whatever coming in.”98 In the absence 
of a highly circulated media vehicle to support its position, the moderate Irish nationalist 
position suffered further. Redmond’s Irish Party would have no dedicated voice in Irish 
America throughout the whole of 1915. Irish American public opinion was now being 
even more heavily influenced by the revolutionary Irish nationalists and the Clan na 
Gael. 
As the Clan utilized their near monopoly of the Irish American press in 1915, Sir 
Roger Casement (the trophy convert to the Irish nationalists) was in Berlin trying to raise 
an Irish brigade from captured Irish soldiers in German POW camps. The covert 
collaboration between the German government and the Clan na Gael/IRB intensified. As 
part of Casement’s efforts for Irish nationalism, he extracted a statement from the 
German under-secretary in the Foreign Office outlining the official German attitude 
towards Ireland, which stated:   
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The Imperial Government formally declares that under no circumstances 
would Germany invade Ireland with a view to its conquest or the overthrow 
of native institutions in that country. [This] government…is inspired by  
goodwill towards a country and a people for whom Germany desires only  
national prosperity and national freedom. 99 
 
 
Unfortunately for Sir Roger Casement, this statement would be his greatest 
success on behalf of revolutionary Irish nationalism. His other goal would not be 
actualized, for the Irish Brigade was dead in the water from the outset. He naïvely 
believed he could get non-commissioned officers- many who served with their regiment 
for ten years or more- to desert their regiments to fight against the British in Ireland.100 
Sir Roger Casement’s subsequent involvement with the IRB and the Clan na Gael would 
be further degraded by John Devoy’s distrust of Casement. While Casement’s mission to 
Germany was ultimately a failure, Casement’s publicity value to the Irish nationalist 
cause was not yet depleted. The Clan’s policy and program to agitate for Irish 
independence from America would not have been nearly as publicized without the 
involvement of Sir Roger Casement.  
The failing gasps of the Irish parliamentary position in America created a void 
that the Clan rushed to fill. The disenchantment with a moderate, constitutional solution 
to the Irish question grew more pronounced. To profit from this entirely new 
demographic that joined the cause, the Clan needed to create a new organization that 
operated publicly, in order to combat the political elites’ belief that the majority of the 
Irish in America still supported John Redmond and Home Rule. Accordingly, the Clan 
began planning a convention that would bring together prominent Irish Americans from 
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all over the United States. This planning would occupy the last quarter of 1915, even as 
plans for a future rebellion moved from rhetoric to reality. 
 Devoy and the Clan sought to influence elite state officials such as the German 
Foreign Office to facilitate a collaboration between the German government and their 
own Clan na Gael/ IRB. With the help of the prestigious convert, Sir Roger Casement, 
the Clan and the Irish Republican Brotherhood cooperated with Germany to agitate for 
Irish independence. Although the alliance was covert, Devoy kept the Gaelic American 
decidedly pro-German, consistently keeping British faults and failures before his reading 
public. The Clan’s mission was deeply indebted to the failures of John Redmond’s war-
time policy of utmost cooperation with the British government. The failure of 
implementation of Home Rule, and its indefinite postponement aligned these failures 
squarely with Redmond and his Irish Party. The war’s duration further exacerbated 
Redmond’s woes, for recruiting amongst the Irish was already fraught with political 
quagmires. Redmond’s recruiting activities further strained his tenuous grasp on the 
moderate Irish and Irish American majorities. The defections from the Redmondite 
position can be traced to his war-time program of accommodation, and the Clan was 
quick to capitalize. The stagnation of the United Irish League in America also contributed 
to Redmond’s faltering appeal to Irish Americans, and by 1915 the organization was 
essentially shuttered.  
 The Clan and Irish Republican Brotherhood maintained their coordination 
throughout 1915, in fact, their partnership became even more productive with the greater 
funds being collected via Clan dues. Devoy was able to send regular amounts to fund the 
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IRB, and couriers carried it across the Atlantic to fund arms for the IRB.101 The split in 
the Irish Volunteers actually created a tighter, more cohesive group that was not 
sympathetic to Redmond, and this brand of loyalty was crucial as the Irish Party lost 
ground, and the revolutionaries gained it. Plus, the Irish Volunteers were deeply 
infiltrated at all levels by the IRB, so they were most assuredly quasi-rebels, whether they 
realized it or not.102  
 1915 activated several currents that pulsed steadily below the surface in Irish 
nationalism, but now emerged full-tide. In 1915, the Clan maintained its steadfast 
opposition to anything short of Irish independence, but they were aided by outside world 
events that actually increased its effectiveness: the continuing World War, the lack of an 
effective Home Rule/ Redmond voice in the Irish American press, public relations 
symbolism such as O’Donovan Rossa’s funeral, and John Redmond’s blind allegiance to 
his own war-time policy. The Clan looked ahead to 1916 with greater resources, stronger 
allies, and a forthcoming rebellion. In 1916, the revolutionaries in Ireland would rise.   
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            CONCLUSION 
           TIDAL WAVE (1916) 
 
Coinciding with the newer, more republican Irish American sentiment, the Clan 
na Gael issued a call for the leaders of Irish America to join together in New York City in 
March of 1915 for an “Irish Race Convention.” Lest this convention’s goals be 
misunderstood, the Gaelic American trumpeted its purpose clearly on its front page: “No 
Man Not in Favor of Complete Irish Freedom Need Apply For Admission.” When Devoy 
rose to speak, he quieted the crowd, but only spoke blandly of “imprudent speech.” But a 
quick perusal of the slightly buried article in the Gaelic American on the establishment of 
the Friends of Irish Freedom, a new public group dedicated to Irish independence, 
illuminates Devoy’s greater accomplishment: the officers, directors, and executives of the 
Friends of Irish Freedom were nearly all Clan na Gael men. Perhaps Devoy’s rare 
reserve was because he knew what the gathered conventioneers did not: a rebellion in 
Ireland was less than six weeks away.    
The moderate Irish position gradually ebbed away, giving way to a flooding 
current of Irish republicanism. In 1916, the Clan channeled the newly republican 
sentiment into one great movement for Irish independence. The Clan’s vigorous public 
relations effort in Irish America’s media, combined with foreign relations interventions at 
the state level, and intimate collaboration with the Irish Republican Brotherhood marked 
the great final thrust for Irish independence. The most direct contribution the Clan made 
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to the Easter Rising in Dublin, April 24, 1916 was their unwavering fundraising efforts. 
The political revolution could not have commenced without the economic support of the 
hard currency provided by the Clan. The sustained cost of the resistance over the 
previous twenty years of activism was possible only through the Clan’s dues, and 
fundraising appeals made directly to the upwardly mobile Irish Americans that made up 
the Gaelic American’s readership. The Easter Rising was the culmination of the Clan’s 
financial work for the previous twenty years. 
 Through the coordination of the Clan na Gael and the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood, the previous four years witnessed greater success in recruitment and 
fundraising for both organizations. The IRB leadership was well-known to their 
counterparts- many of the Irishmen travelled extensively to America on fundraising trips 
for various organizations. Padraig Pearse had a personal relationship with Devoy and 
Cohalan, Thomas Clarke was Devoy’s personal secretary in New York several years 
earlier.103 The close relationships on both sides of the Atlantic helped foster the trust that 
allowed the two organizations to operate and function nearly independently, but with the 
same goal. The collaboration between the two groups was nearly flawless, particularly 
considering the Atlantic that separated them. Both groups learned from the prior mistakes 
of the Fenians, and operated as cells, with very little overlap between them. Such 
operational security was obligatory, for the IRB was a separatist movement the British 
government suppressed ruthlessly. Even more, the British were adept at infiltrating the 
Irish independence groups, and Irish republican history was rife with examples of traitors, 
and double agents.  
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For the IRB and the Clan to get this close to a rebellion without an internal leak 
was a near miracle. To protect this conspiracy, the two groups only communicated via 
ciphers in telegrams, and personal trans-Atlantic couriers. One such courier, Tommy 
O’Connor, arrived at Devoy’s offices at the Gaelic American on February 5, 1916. 
O’Connor was a frequent courier between the IRB and the Clan; he was a steward on a 
Cunard liner, and thus travelled between the United States and Ireland without suspicion. 
O’Connor handed a sealed envelope to Devoy. The enclosed ciphered message was from 
the Supreme Council of the IRB. It read: 
We have decided to begin action on Easter Sunday. We must have your arms and 
munitions in Limerick between Good Friday and Easter Saturday. We expect 
German help immediately after beginning action. We might be compelled to 
begin earlier. 104    
 
It was less than three months away. The IRB completely infiltrated the Irish Volunteers, 
but they still lacked adequate arms.  Although Devoy sent over $100,000 to Ireland and 
the IRB in the last six months, it was still not enough to fund a successful gun-running 
operation beneath British noses. There was much work to be done. This work required 
the German conspirators. 
 The Clan’s German alliance/conspiracy was the most delicate of their three-
pronged campaign for Irish independence. The advent of World War One made any Irish 
overtures immediately treasonous, therefore Irish Americans would have to take the lead 
in any advances made to the German government. Sir Roger Casement was supposed to 
be the personal link between the Clan quasi-officially, and the German government. 
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Casement, the trophy convert to Irish republicanism, was in Berlin to raise his “Irish 
Brigade.” His failure to do so made Casement a liability. Further, Casement’s travelling 
companion, one Adler Christiansen, hectored Devoy for money constantly from the time 
of his association with Casement. An exchange between Joseph McGarrity and Devoy 
reveals Devoy’s suspicions towards Christiansen, whom is referred to as “the nurse.” 
   Dear Joe, 
 
I have got two reports on the nurse. On the first day he did 
not turn up at the house at all. On the second he came out 
late looking very dissipated and went over to NY, where he 
turned back and forward, evidently to avoid being 
followed, met very shady looking men, went into barrooms 
resorted by a gang, stood looking into store windows 
mostly jewelry- for the evident purpose of seeing if there 
was any one on the other side of the street watching him, 
and acted in every way like a professional criminal. Then 
he returned to Jersey and was lost. 
 
A saloonkeeper from his own country has kept for him a 
passport under another name three years ago, on which he 
returned. The places he visited are quiet gambling resorts. 
The y noted the anchor on his hand.  
 
Everything indicates that he is an old hand at this sort of 
life. One of the men after him is his countryman…. 
 
   Yours truly, 
    J.D.105 
  
Clearly, Devoy felt that using Clan resources, i.e. manpower, to follow the “nurse” to 
establish his guilt was worth the expense. It is also worthwhile to note that Joseph 
McGarrity believed that Casement was the second coming of Wolfe Tone. For Devoy to 
so pointedly provide surveillance on Casement’s companion indicates he was desperately 
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trying to establish the unreliability of Casement’s judgment via his choice of companion. 
Particularly so, since Casement was in Germany under the imprimatur of the Clan/IRB, 
and privy to some of the most secret of plans. Devoy’s misgivings towards Casement 
extended to keeping him isolated in Berlin while the most delicate of preparations were 
being made for the rebellion. In fact, Casement was so disillusioned by the Germans by 
this point that he decided a rebellion was pure folly and would result in an Irish 
slaughterhouse. Unfortunately for Devoy and the Clan/IRB, Casement’s activities were 
the least of their worries: British intelligence cracked the German diplomatic codes and 
were fully aware of the conspiracy between German-American-Irish collaborators. Yet 
again, the Irish and Irish Americans were outmaneuvered at the highest levels.  
The Clan’s public relations goals and messaging necessitated a broadly supported, 
public organization to assemble the various Irish American groups that expressed their 
support for the Irish independence movement. Accordingly, the Clan spearheaded a call 
for an “Irish Race Convention,” a gathering of the top Irish American leadership: “Over 
the signature of 350 well-known Irish American leaders, an invitation was sent out on 8 
February inviting some 2,300 reliable Irish Americans to attend.”106 Attendees were 
expected to march in lockstep with its stated mission: the independence of Ireland. Joseph 
McLaughlin, national president of the Ancient Order of Hibernians (AOH), expressed the 
new nationalist fervor succinctly in a letter to John Devoy: “Rest assured, I am strongly 
opposed to admitting any but those whose sentiments are in accord with ours. The 
Convention will neither be the time nor the place to argue who is right, or who is wrong. 
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We’re right, and let the other fellows keep away.”107 The AOH best exemplified the 
change in middle of the road Irish Americans, for they previously supported Home Rule, 
and represented the conservative Irish American majority. However, the combination of 
the world war, John Redmond’s mishandling of the Irish political situation, and the Irish 
American reaction to nativist claims of “dual loyalties” created a decidedly more 
republican spirit in Irish Americans. The Gaelic American publicized the Convention on 
page one the day of its opening, predicting it would “be a success beyond the most 
sanguine expectations of its promoters. The question they [the promoters] are trying to 
solve now is whether the large hall in which the Convention is to be held can hold all 
who will come.”108  When the convention opened, it was in an “atmosphere of fervid 
enthusiasm.”109 Temporary Chairman Justice John W. Goff also provided the keynote 
speech of the Convention.  
The Clan’s public relations efforts and fundraising were activated and supported 
by the creation of the new public organization, the Friends of Irish Freedom (FOIF). The 
FOIF would become the face of the revolutionary Irish American organizations. The 
FOIF was completely saturated with Clan members, and “of the seventeen members of 
the executive committee, fifteen were members of the Clan.”110 While Victor Herbert 
was elected president of the new organization, the real levers of power were operated by 
Judge Daniel C. Cohalan, long-time member of the Executive Council of the Clan na 
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Gael. Cohalan was also one of the very few men that John Devoy trusted implicitly, and 
their partnership spanned the two decades of the Clan’s campaign to influence Irish 
Americans into supporting Ireland’s independence. Steeped in Clan na Gael ideology and 
adherents, one finds the FOIF constitution unsurprising:  
…Today the alert and masterful enemies of England realize that for the peace of 
the world England must be deprived of mastery and domination over Ireland… 
We appeal to the Concert of the Powers, and particularly to America, if she be 
represented in such Council, to recognize that Ireland is a European and not a 
British island; to appreciate that its complete independence and its detachment 
from the British Empire are vital to the freedom of the seas… and we demand in 
the name of liberty and of the small nationalities that Ireland may be cut off from 
England and restored to her rightful place among the nations of the earth.111 
 
 
Coverage from the Gaelic American and Irish World was uniformly ecstatic, but a 
leavening measure of public opinion can be provided by the New York Times coverage of 
the same event. On the second day of the convention, the Times bemoaned the rhetoric of 
the speakers, taking particular issue with the claim that “Ireland’s manhood… was being 
dragged [into the British Army] by force, starvation, or deceit.” The column went further- 
“the best comment on this theory is the fact that, two months ago, there were nearly 
300,000 Irishmen in the British Army, 145,000 who volunteered in Ireland…A fine 
compliment to those brave men, fighting for liberty and democracy-to say that ‘force, 
starvation or deceit’ has made them its victims.”112  
Naturally, John Redmond and the Home Rulers disowned the proceedings in New 
York City, and their Irish American counterparts denounced the conference, and resolved 
“…The Irish in Ireland are not contract breakers. Ever since O’Connell’s day they have 
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fought for Home Rule (first as ‘Repeal of the Union’). Now that it is granted them, they 
are keeping their part of the contract. They have sent 142,000 of their sons, voluntarily 
and without ‘force, starvation, or deceit’ to the front, and are adding to that force at the 
rate of 1,000 a week.”113 Yet no matter how the moderate Home Rule position protested, 
the sheer energy and thunder of the Irish independence movement drowned out the more 
muted, traditional Home Rule stance. The Clan was succeeding, not through the success 
of their public relations campaign necessarily, but because they were ever alert to 
advantageous shifts in public opinion, and ever quick to exploit them. The creation of the 
Friends of Irish Freedom gave the Clan a public platform for operations, and most 
importantly- a fundraising conduit. Less than two weeks after its inception, the FOIF 
raised sufficient funds to enable Devoy to send $10,000 to the IRB via trans-Atlantic 
courier.  
  Four weeks later, Irish rebels rose in Dublin. The severe constraints on 
communications created by the reliance on trans-Atlantic couriers between the IRB and 
the Clan led to garbled, incorrect information crossing both directions. The dates of the 
German infiltration of the weapons so desperately needed for the rebellion were 
alternately placed between Easter Friday, Saturday and Sunday. The lack of precision in 
logistics did not just extend to a German distribution of weapons- John Devoy’s own 
estimate of Irish republican strength was grossly exaggerated by his reliance on the 
support of the Redmondite faction of the Irish Volunteers, whom Devoy promised would 
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also rise in rebellion when the time came.114 Casement did attempt to stop the rebellion: 
put ashore by German submarine, he was captured on Good Friday. The British navy 
intercepted the German trawler carrying the arms meant for the rebellion, and the 
Germans scuttled the boat, sending the weapons to the bottom of the sea. Rather than 
cancel the rebellion altogether, the Military Council of the IRB decided to go ahead after 
a twenty-four-hour postponement. The Rising began on Easter Monday, Aril 24, 1916. It 
was crushed by the following Sunday.  
 The Clan na Gael held the torch of Irish independence aloft in America for over 
thirty years. From 1912-1916, the Clan activated a tri-segmented campaign to agitate for 
Irish independence: public relations promotions, collaboration with the IRB, and 
interventions with head-of-state actors on both sides of the Atlantic. The pages of the 
Gaelic American and Irish World highlighted the public relations segment of the 
campaign. These weeklies also allowed the Clan na Gael to promote the massive 
demonstrations, conventions, and meetings that spurred Irish American donations in 
support of the Irish independence movement. The Irish Race Convention in 1916 
officially repudiated the parliamentary party politics of Home Rule and John Redmond, 
collected the cream of Irish American leadership to provide a mandate for Irish 
independence, and created the Friends of Irish Freedom. The FOIF was the leading 
advocate of Irish independence for the following ten years.  
 Although the Rising was a political failure in the short term, it ultimately paved 
the way for an independent Ireland. The Rising would not have been possible without the 
financial support of the Clan na Gael. However, the Clan’s collaboration with the IRB 
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was successful. The ability to create a trans-oceanic partnership, given the constraints 
posed by secrecy and “modern” communications, boded well for future activities. The 
Irish Republican Brotherhood would outlive the Rising, although the majority of its 
leadership was executed in British reprisals. But there would be other leaders.  
 The conspiracy between Germans and Irish and Irish Americans was also 
ultimately unsuccessful. But it showed the confidence with which Irish Americans were 
now operating on behalf of Irish independence. The advent of World War One provided a 
useful banner to gather American dissidents under- the most vocal advocates of American 
neutrality were the two largest immigrant groups in America: the Germans and Irish. 
They became natural allies, aligned through their mutual distaste of the British. The Clan 
exploited this organic partnership and extended it further, always maneuvering to give 
Irish independence the greatest advantage. The apex of the Clan’s foreign relations 
activities, the third segment of their campaign for Irish independence, was the covert 
agreement between the German government and the IRB, facilitated by the Clan as a 
quasi-neutral go-between.  
 When the twentieth century began, the Clan na Gael was a small, tightly-knit 
group of oath-bound agitators for Irish independence. Rising from the ashes of the Fenian 
Brotherhood, the Clan maintained the Fenian commitment to Ireland’s complete 
separation from the British Empire. The first decade of the twentieth century witnessed 
greater Irish American participation in foreign relations, yet the majority of moderate 
Irish in America were content with a Home Rule solution to the Irish question. By the 
1910’s, a new current was sweeping Ireland and America alike, and the Clan na Gael 
worked tirelessly to harness the new spirit of Irish nationalism. The election of Woodrow 
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Wilson in 1912 invigorated the Irish American opposition, who saw Wilson’s 
Anglophilia as a direct threat. As the winds of war swept over Europe, the Clan seized the 
opportunity presented by Europe’s bloodbath to relentlessly advocate neutrality. By 1915, 
the Great War entangled America via the huge loans secured by the Allied Powers. 
Neutrality was becoming a lost hope. Nonetheless, the Clan persisted in their efforts, 
joining forces with German Americans overtly, and the German government covertly, 
with the motto “England’s loss is Ireland’s gain.” As long as America remained officially 
neutral, such agitation could not be labeled treasonous or unpatriotic. The Clan was aided 
in their fight against Home Rule by an unlikely and accidental ally: the Ulster Unionists 
in Ireland were also virulently opposed to Home Rule, and worked just as assiduously to 
kill it. When the Unionists formed the Ulster Volunteer Force to “protect the Union,” the 
Irish nationalists felt perfectly justified in forming their own similar organization. 
Additionally, by 1915, the war-time policies of John Redmond and his Irish Party 
repelled Irish Americans, who felt that Redmond betrayed Ireland and the Irish by first 
accepting postponement of Home Rule, and then promoting Irish recruitment for the 
British Army. The momentum that Redmond marshalled to force the Home Rule bill was 
squandered primarily by the advent of war, and then by Redmond’s constant 
appeasement to the British government. The politicization of the Irish Volunteers, and 
Redmond’s subsequent takeover of that organization created a further breach in Irish 
nationalist sentiment. The tide decidedly shifted, and the moderate Irish position 
gradually ebbed away, giving way to a flooding current of Irish republicanism. In 1916, 
the Clan channeled the newly republican sentiment into one great movement for Irish 
independence. The Clan’s vigorous public relations effort in America’s media, combined 
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with foreign relations interventions at the head-of-state level, and intimate collaboration 
with the Irish Republican Brotherhood marked the great final thrust for Irish 
independence.  
The Easter Rising on Monday, April 24, 1916 was the culmination of the Clan’s 
work for the previous twenty years. The Rising was an abject failure. But the theme of 
the Clan’s exploitation of outside events to the benefit of the cause of Irish independence 
continued. Through the efforts of John Devoy and the Clan na Gael in the years 1912-
1916, Irish American opinion and the Irish American Roman Catholic hierarchy were 
persuaded that only an independent, republican Ireland was an acceptable political 
solution to the “Irish Question.” The wake of the Rising and America’s entry into the war 
both advanced the tide of Irish independence. It soon became a tidal wave. 
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